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Distribution automation is a fundamental part of distribution network operation. In Fin-
land, the goal is to increase the number of automated functions in a distribution network, 
because of the constantly tightening requirements for decreasing the duration of outages. 
For students, who study power engineering, it is beneficial to understand the possibilities 
of distribution automation.     
In Tampere University of Technology, the course Distribution Automation ensures the 
understanding of the fundamentals of distribution automation and network operation for 
students. The course includes lecture subjects, written exercises and laboratory assign-
ments. 
The main objective of this thesis is to improve and update laboratory environments of 
distribution automation for the course Distribution Automation. The laboratory environ-
ments should help students understand distribution network protection, the role of DMS 
and SCADA system, and smart metering. 
This thesis examines previous laboratory implementations on the course and distribution 
automation in general. The laboratory environments and students’ feedback from previ-
ous laboratory implementations are presented in this thesis. The chapter on distribution 
automation displays information about distribution network protection, SCADA and 
DMS systems, AMI system and protocols. The distribution network protection section 
presents basic needs and regulations for distribution network protection. SCADA and 
DMS section introduces functionalities of these systems whereas smart metering section 
describes AMI system naming and structure. Protocols and standards section describes 
IEC 104, IEC 61850, OPC, DLMS/COSEM, object oriented information models and OSI 
model communication structures.   
As a result of this thesis, implementations from two different laboratory environments are 
introduced. The first laboratory implementation includes distribution network protection 
and IEDs. The second laboratory implementation includes a smart meter, DMS and 
SCADA systems, and remote communication between the control center, the substation 
and the smart meter. 
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Suomessa jakeluverkon automaation määrä kasvaa, koska vaatimukset keskeytysaikojen 
lyhentymiseksi kiristyvät. Sähköverkkoja opiskelevien opiskelijoiden onkin tärkeää 
ymmärtää sähköverkon automaation ratkaisuista ja sen tuomista mahdollisuuksista 
verkon käytössä kuten vikojen selvityksessä.  
Tampereen Teknillisessä Yliopistossa (TTY) opiskelijat voivat tutustua jakeluverkon 
automaatioon kurssilla Distribution Automation. Kurssin sisältöön kuuluu luentoja, 
kirjallisia harjoitustöitä ja laboratorioharjoituksia. 
Tämän tutkielman tarkoituksena on kehittää ja uudistaa jakeluverkon automaatiota 
käsittelevän kurssin laboratorioympäristöjä. Töiden tarkoituksena on tukea opiskelijoiden 
ymmärrystä aiheista jakeluverkon suojaus, käytöntukijärjestelmä ja SCADA, ja älykkäät 
sähkömittarit.  
Tutkielmassa esitellään aikaisempien laboratoriotöiden rakenne ja opiskelijoiden 
antamaa palautetta kurssin toteutuksesta. Jakeluverkon automaatiota käsittelevässä 
kappaleessa tutustutaan jakeluverkon suojaukseen, käytöntuki- ja SCADA-järjestelmään, 
älykkäisiin mittarijärjestelmiin ja protokolliin. Jakeluverkon suojauksessa tutustutaan 
suojauksen vaatimuksiin ja toteutuksen käytäntöihin. Käytöntuki- ja SCADA-
järjestelmää käsiteltäessä tutustutaan järjestelmien toiminnallisuuksiin ja rooliin verkon 
käytössä. Älykkäiden mittareiden tapauksessa tutustutaan AMI-järjestelmän termistöön 
ja rakenteeseen. Protokolliin ja standardeihin tutustuttaessa esitellään olio-malli ja 
tietoliikenteen OSI-mallin, joiden kautta tutustutaan työn kannalta tärkeisiin 
standardeihin ja protokolliin: IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC ja DLMS/COSEM.  
Työn tuloksena kehitettiin kaksi laboratorioympäristöä kuvaamaan jakeluverkon 
automaatiota pääasiassa opiskelijoille. Ensimmäinen laboratorioympäristö kuvaa 
jakeluverkon suojauksen toimintaa ja kennoterminaalireleitä. Toisessa laboratoriossa 
esitellään älykäs sähkömittari, käytöntukijärjestelmä ja tiedonsiirtoa jakeluverkon 
käyttökeskukselta sähköasemalle ja älykkäälle mittarille. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Society is reliable on sustainable electricity delivery. Electricity Market Legislation give 
requirements for distribution system operators (DSOs) from allowed outage durations in 
Finland. An act, towards shorter interruption times for consumers, is increasing the 
amount of automated functionalities in the network operation. These automated function-
alities are known as distribution automation. Due to the key role of distribution automa-
tion in the distribution network operation, it is important that students have an under-
standing from the basic principles of distribution automation.  
The laboratory of Electrical Energy Engineering in Tampere University of Technology 
(TUT) offers a course on distribution automation, in which students learn the basics of 
distribution automation. The course includes lectures and laboratory assignments. The 
purpose of this thesis is to improve the laboratory environment for the course. 
1.1 TUT’s course Distribution Automation description 
The course Distribution Automation provides information about automated functionali-
ties within the distribution network operation and control. Students will understand oper-
ation principles and the benefits of distribution automation, and the structure and func-
tions of automation systems. They will learn the basics from relay protection and the 
future trends of distribution automation. The course includes lectures, writing assign-
ments and laboratory assignments. 
Laboratory assignments demonstrate the practical system and visualize distribution auto-
mation for students. During the laboratory assignments students get in physical contact 
with distribution network automation. Laboratory assignments are based on lecture sub-
jects, writing assignments and pre-laboratory assignments. 
1.2 Focus and Objectives of the thesis 
This thesis focuses on updating and creating new laboratory assignments on distribution 
automation and improving the laboratory environment. Laboratory assignments mainly 
concern students. A laboratory assistant is present during exercises. The laboratory of 
Electrical Energy Engineering has an environment for distribution network simulations, 
and distribution automation devices. The scope of the laboratory assignments must be 
planned so that TUT’s requirements for course credits and implementation are fulfilled. 
The course area is divided into three categories in this thesis. These categories are intel-
ligent electric devices (IEDs) and protection, distribution network operation and control, 
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and smart meter and its possibilities. The operation and control part is new and need to 
be integrated to laboratory exercises. Operation and control will include Distribution 
Management System (DMS) and System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. 
The laboratory pre-assignments and assignments in the laboratory will be kept similar as 
in the earlier laboratory implementations. The main focus is on updating the laboratory 
environments. Laboratory instructions will be developed for assistants. These instructions 
will in turn include information on building the laboratory environment and instructions 
on how to operate with students during the laboratory assignments. 
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2. PREVIOUS LABORATORY ASSIGNMENTS 
This chapter focuses on the background of this thesis. Chapter presents description from 
both previous laboratory systems, student assignments and technical information from 
laboratories.  
The first laboratory exercise concentrates on relays. The second laboratory presents low 
voltage automation in the distribution network.  
Both laboratories use Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) to distribution network simu-
lation and describing interaction with distribution automation. RTDS is capable of simu-
lating power network in real time. 
2.1 Substation automation laboratory 
The idea of the laboratory is to get familiar with the distribution network protection and 
relays interaction in the distribution network. The distribution network is simulated with 
RTDS and the simulated network consists of primary substation, 110kV network, four 
medium voltage feeders and loads that are connected directly to medium voltage network. 
Laboratory relays are located on substations busbar and a feeder. 
System structure of the laboratory is presented in Figure 1 below. System includes RTDS, 
amplifier, feeder protective relay and control unit PC for RTDS. In addition to equipment 
in the figure, the laboratory environment also includes busbar protective relay and con-
figuration PC, from which busbar protection relay simulates busbar protection and con-
figuration PC is for updating relays configurations. In Figure 1 PC controls the simulation 
environment as well as presents the network model and sends commands to RTDS. RTDS 
executes network model simulation and simulated voltage and current values are sent 
through RTDS analog outputs to amplifier where the amplified current and voltage values 
are taken to protection relays. Relays breaker operations are sent through hardwired con-
nection to RTDS digital input card. Feeder protection relay have hardwired connection to 
busbar protection relay for a blocking message. 
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Figure 1. Simulation environment. 
The laboratory exercise tasks are mostly concentrated on distribution network protection. 
The tasks are detecting the operation of busbar protective relay and feeder protective re-
lay. Relays’ detect faults and trip when effective value of protection function is exceeded. 
2.1.1 Technology and simulation environment 
Substation automation laboratory system consists of two ABB REX521 relays, RTDS 
simulator, control unit PC, relay configuration PC, amplifier and three different computer 
programs. Programs are RSCAD, CAP501 and Vampset. 
REX521 is design to feeder protection in medium voltage level and it has not been ABB’s 
active product since 2012 [1]. REX521 M01 is used as feeder protective relay and 
REX521 H04S in busbar protection which is enriched version from feeder protection 
REX. REX devices’ disturbance recordings are read and settings are configured through 
optical adapter with 19,2kB/s data transferring speed. 19,2kB/s is slow speed for config-
uration and reading files when comparing to more advanced REF protection devices that 
has 10MB/s to 100MB/s data transferring speed [2].  
Both REX521 devices have three protection functions each. Two of these functions are 
for overcurrent protection: low set, and high set current protection. Feeder protection de-
vice low set stage settings are 56A rated current and 400ms operation delay, and for high 
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set stage the settings are 1400A rated current and 50ms operation delay. For busbar pro-
tection relay low set stage current setting is 225A rated current and 600ms operation delay 
and for high set stage current limit is 1600A and operation delay is 200ms. The high set 
stage current protection of the busbar protection is possible to block from feeder protec-
tion device with hardwired connection. Protection functions tripping signals are send to 
RTDS Gigabit-Transceiver Front Panel Interface (GTFPI) card. The protection functions 
tripping is presented with Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) on relays’ panel and faults are 
recorded to disturbance recordings.  
Third protection function is earth fault protection. Earth fault protection functions, at 
feeder and busbar devices, are designed to operate with 1000Ω fault resistance. Earth 
fault protection settings for feeder is 4A (2,1% from nominal current) residual current and 
400ms operation delay. At busbar protective device, protection settings are 6kV (30% 
from nominal voltage) residual voltage and 600ms operation delay.  
REXs’ configurations and disturbance recordings are handled with configuration PC. 
Configuration PC is used for relays’ configuration and reading disturbance recordings. 
Disturbance recordings are read with CAP501 and disturbance recordings are down-
loaded and analyzed with Vampset program. Configuration PC uses Windows XP, but 
Windows XP support has ended, which makes the system unsecure.  
The distribution network is modelled with RTDS simulator in the laboratory. Control unit 
PC run an RSCAD software which is the program used for running RTDS simulations. 
From RSCAD’s tools were used Draft, T-line and Runtime. Simulation network model is 
developed with Draft module, network parameters are modified with T-line and Runtime 
module controls and monitors simulations. 
The simulated network is a distribution substation, which has four feeders and one input 
from high voltage network. Figure 2 below presents the simulation model. The model 
consists of four outgoing feeders that have AF87 overhead line model blocks, and one of 
the feeder and busbar include fault locations. The network is unearthed system, although 
the primary transformer has connection to ground (the grounding resistor is 100kΩ), and 
the voltage source has unlimited short circuit current. Circuit breakers are located at the 
end of input feeder and at the beginning of one outgoing feeder. At the end of each feeder 
are located 1,5MVA three phase loads. 
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Figure 2. Simulation model. 
The network model’s circuit breakers are controlled with circuit breaker control logic. 
Control logic is presented in Figure 3 below. The control logic receives relays’ tripping 
signals trough GTFPI card from which tripping signals are converted to logical form with 
world-to-bit block that is followed by signal generators that trigger when blocks receive 
signals from relays. Signal generators are followed by delay blocks, to present operation 
time of circuit breakers. From delay blocks signals are forwarded to circuit breaker mod-
els.  
 
Figure 3. Circuit breaker control logic. 
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Voltage and current measurements are taken through measurement logic to relays from 
the network model. Measurement logic is presented in Figure 4 below. The top circuit in 
the figure is for analog voltage and current outputs to relays through Gigabit-Transceiver 
Analog Output (GTAO) card. Residual voltage is calculated from the sum of measured 
values and multiplied with constant 0,3333, whereas residual current is calculated from 
sum of phase currents. The figure’s bottom circuit is for sensor measurements that are 
needed for sensor inputs of busbar protection relay. 
 
Figure 4. Voltage and current outputs. 
Figure 4 measurements are forwarded with physical GTAO to relays. GTAO card outputs 
are connected to an OMICRON amplifier and busbar protective devices. The amplifier is 
connected to protective devices. 
2.1.2 Student assignments 
Students’ assignments consist of pre-laboratory assignments and laboratory assignments. 
In the pre-laboratory assignments students get knowledge about laboratory area before 
participating in the laboratory. 
In the pre-laboratory assignments, students draw relay connections, calculate network pa-
rameters and get familiar with computer programs, which are used in the laboratory ex-
ercise. Students draw relay connections, and calculate load current, short circuit and earth 
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fault values. Short circuit currents are calculated in cases where there is three-phase short 
circuit in beginning of the feeder and phase-to-phase short circuit in the end of the feeder. 
Earth-fault is calculated with 1000Ω fault resistance between line and ground. Calculated 
currents are then used to set operation stages for protective devices. 
Laboratory exercise begins with connecting the feeder protective relay and setting its pa-
rameters. Parameters are set according to the values which are calculated by the students 
during the pre-laboratory assignments. After connecting relay and setting configuration, 
students simulate earth faults and short circuit faults in the network. Simulations are mon-
itored and analyzed with control unit PC and disturbance recording software at configu-
ration PC. During the simulations students analyze protection sensitivity, selectivity, 
back-up protection and blocking signal function. Last exercise investigates how changing 
of feeder length does affect to feeder protective relay operation.  
2.2 Smart meter laboratory 
The second exercise presents smart meter as a part of distribution automation. The idea 
of the exercise is to describe smart grid, and low voltage automation. 
Figure 5 below shows laboratory system. The system has one smart meter, RTDS, ampli-
fier and control unit PC. In addition to devices in the figure, the laboratory environment 
includes also secondary substation (SS) master unit, SCADA computer and communica-
tion network. The laboratory network model consists of high voltage, medium voltage 
and low voltage network. Network loads are connected to low and medium voltage net-
works. Smart meter is located on low voltage side, and smart meter measures phase quan-
tities and sends data to SS. SS computer stores smart meter data and forwards commands 
from control PC to the meter. The SS computer presents decentralized computing. 
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Figure 5. Laboratory two environment. 
2.2.1 Technical information and simulation environment 
The second exercise has same distribution network simulation environment as the first 
laboratory. The second laboratory system consists of RTDS environment, smart meter, 
SS, SCADA and information communication technology (ICT). ICT consists of smart 
meter, two Power-Line Communication (PLC) modems, two switchers, low voltage 
SCADA and SS computer. 
Smart meter is Laatuvahti by MxElectrix. Smart meter measurement inputs are from 
RTDS GTAO card. The GTAO card is connected to the amplifier and the amplifier’s 
outputs are connected to the meter. GTAO card output voltages are limited, because the 
amplifier cannot amplify safely voltages that are over 250V. The mart meter has ability 
to send alarms, measuring information and control signal which is send to RTDS GTFPI 
card. From smart meter alarms, available alarms are changed phase order, neutral con-
ductor and fuse blown. From measurements are provided voltage, current, active and re-
active power, and harmonics information. 
ICT connects the low voltage system, SS and information system together. Laboratory 
ICT implementation uses two network switches where smart meter is connected to one 
switch and low voltage SCADA, and secondary substation PC to another.  
SS computer has Ubuntu 12.04 operating system. Support for the distribution ended in 
28.4.2017. SS receive information from smart meter and writes it to its database where 
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information is then analyzed. Database uses IEC 61850 information model naming and 
IEC 61850 Manufacturing Message Structure (MMS) protocol in communication to 
SCADA system. 
Low voltage SCADA is iControl’s and ran on virtual Windows XP. The main operating 
system is Windows 7. 
Network model in laboratory consists of medium voltage network and low voltage net-
work. All faults are simulated in the low voltage network. Model of the low voltage net-
work is in Figure 6 below. The low voltage network is three-phase system with neutral 
conductor. Faults are simulated with breakers and measured low voltage load is located 
at the end of the feeder. The load and grounding resistances can be modified with sliders.  
 
Figure 6. Low voltage network model. 
2.2.2 Student assignments 
In the assignment students simulate normal conditions and fault conditions in the low 
voltage network. In the pre-laboratory assignments, students calculate voltages in several 
load conditions, and during the laboratory, students monitor the smart meter. 
In pre-laboratory assignments students use a Matlab tool to calculate voltage unbalance 
in normal and neutral fault situations in the low voltage network. The Matlab tool is de-
veloped in TUT. To use the tool in the low voltage network calculation, user needs to 
provide initial network and load information. The network information includes high volt-
age, medium voltage and low voltage network resistances and inductances. The low volt-
age load information includes load impedance and wye point grounding resistance. The 
default source voltage is 230V phase voltage and 120 degrees difference between phases 
in the tool. As a result, the tool produces phase voltage and neutral voltage vectors and 
polar forms from calculations. After the calculations, students are asked to design alarm 
levels for the smart meter. 
In the laboratory exercise, students use calculated values for simulations and detect how 
smart meter, control unit, database and SCADA present the situations. Students also de-
tect how different kind of low voltage side faults are seen in SCADA, control unit and 
smart meter. 
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2.3 Course feedback 
Feedback gathered from students has a vital role when improving course content. In TUT, 
course feedback is collected with Kaiku system. For this thesis, also external feedback 
was collected regarding course content and laboratories. Results from both, Kaiku feed-
back and external enquiry, are presented in this chapter. External feedback was collected 
from last two implementations. Last two implementations where held during the spring 
2017 and the spring 2016. At the 2017 implementations there were 63 participants and at 
the 2016 implementation there were 41 participants.  
At TUT, course feedback is mandatory. Students see their grades after giving course feed-
back. Typical Kaiku form includes multiple choice questions and few open fields. It is 
not mandatory to answer to any multiple choice question or fill any of open fields. In this 
chapter open field feedback is analyzed. There were approximately 12 answers to each 
open field questions. 
External enquiry was sent for students by e-mail. 12 answers were collected. Enquiry 
included questions about course content and laboratory implementations. Enquire con-
tained multiple choice and open field question. 
2.3.1 Kaiku feedback 
This part examines open field questions from Distribution Automation course Kaiku feed-
back. The questions of Distribution Automation course were as follows; “What worked 
well during the course?” and “How would you develop the course?” Those, who gave 
course feedback in Kaiku, thought that the course was interesting and laboratories were 
important.  
At spring 2017 implementation, students felt that laboratories were useful. Moreover, 
visiting lecturers got positive feedback from the audience and overall course content 
about information systems was interesting. Most of the respondents felt that there is no 
need for improvements. Few persons felt that distribution protection should be explained 
in more detailed.  
2016 Kaiku feedback has similar responses to those at spring 2017. Responders felt that 
laboratories were useful and course content was interesting. Few of the answers men-
tioned that there could be more assignments. 
2.3.2 External Enquiry 
This part examines enquiry that was send to students who had taken the course distribu-
tion automation. There where 12 responders and they had taken the course during the 
spring 2017 or the spring 2016. 
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The most of the respondents had taken the course during last implementation. Persons 
felt that course content was still bright in mind. Responders remembered what SCADA 
system and DMS system are. They also had genuine understanding about AMR system.  
The answers regarding the first laboratory suggested that participants had understood the 
assignments. Laboratory instructions were clear and there was enough guidance. The an-
swers regarding the second laboratory included few comments stating that participants 
were not able to remember what they had done in the laboratory. However, most of the 
students felt that pre-laboratory questions were useful. Both laboratories were considered 
as safe although, according to the participants, laboratory environment should be cleaner. 
Responders had left three answers to open word question. One responder wished that the 
laboratory would concentrate more on ICT structure of substations. Relay protection op-
eration and wave forms were wished to be present better, too. Laboratory instructions 
were hoped to be more understandable. 
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3. DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATION 
The importance of distribution automation has increased due to a growing interest in 
smart grids [3]. Distribution automation is used in network protection, controlling and 
monitoring. Automation enables one to accomplish these tasks remotely. The term distri-
bution automation covers distribution automation system and distribution management.  
A distribution automation system refers to technologies that enable one to coordinate, 
monitor and operate a distribution network from remote locations. These technologies 
include functionalities, network devices and communication systems. Figure 7 below il-
lustrates distribution automation. 
 
Figure 7. Distribution automation [4, 5]. 
Figure 7 illustrates the layers of distribution automation. Inside the boxes are examples 
of automation equipment used on each layer. The top layer is called planning, in which 
the Network Information System (NIS) is applied in a long term development of the dis-
tribution network [6]. The second level combines different Information Technologies 
(IT), such as DMS and SCADA, in network operation. The third level is distribution net-
work level, which contains substations and feeders. In this thesis, the distribution network 
will be considered to include primary substations, feeders, secondary substations and cus-
tomer connection points. On the bottom layer there is customer automation that includes 
smart metering, demand side management (DSM) and load control for example.  
Planning
(NIS)
Operation and control
(DMS, SCADA)
Substations and feeders
(IED, RTU, IEC 61850)
Customer automation
(Smart metering, DSM)
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Figure 8 below shows how distribution automation is located in relation to the distribution 
network. The distribution network, substations, medium voltage and low voltage feeders, 
and SS are referred to as the primary process in Figure 8. On the distribution automation 
side are equipment that help in remote operation of the distribution network. Substations, 
feeders and customer level have IEDs, RTUs, customer automation and other substation 
automation such as tap changer. Distribution automation side also consists of remote 
communication, SCADA, metering system, DMS, customer information system (CIS) 
and other information systems such as metering data management system (MDMS). DMS 
has important role in the distribution automation system because it has access to various 
information systems to build overall view from the distribution network [6, 7]. 
DMS
SCADARTU
Other 
automation
IED
IED
Customer 
automation
Metering
system
Other 
information 
systems
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Customer 
information 
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Distribution automationPrimary process
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Figure 8. Distribution automation functions [8]. 
This chapter will focus on the three bottom layers of Figure 7 earlier above. The chapter 
introduces terms and functionalities of distribution automation, and communication pro-
tocols.  
3.1 Intelligent electric devices 
IED is the term used for multipurpose devices in the electricity distribution utilities. These 
devices are used for protection, control, metering, communication and fault recordings in 
the distribution network [4, 9]. In the distribution network protection, the term protection 
relay has often been used to describe device which is meant to protect a distribution net-
work. The term relay is not enough to describe devices’ functionalities which protect dis-
tribution networks today. 
The development towards IED began in the 1960s, when digital-based relaying was sug-
gested to use in power system substation protection. In the beginning of digital relaying, 
15 
the main focus of research was algorithms to detect faults from voltage and current wave 
forms [10]. Proposed algorithms were based on Fourier methods. Digital relays also in-
troduced the possibility to provide multiple protection functionalities for one protective 
device. One protective device was now able to contain all the protection schemes that 
were needed in feeder protection for example [11]. Digital relays developed to numerical 
relays which are based on microprocessors. These microprocessor based devices intro-
duced the possibility for more functionalities than just protection, as the microprocessor 
relays where able to transfer and receive controlling information [9]. 
After realizing that relays could be used for multiple purposes instead of just protection, 
manufacturers started to develop devices with multiple functionalities. The relays started 
to provide more than just protection functionalities. The term relay was not descriptive 
enough to define the devices anymore, thus the IED was born [9]. 
IEDs have multiple functionalities and software is an important part of these devices. The 
voltage and current measurement as well as the communication functionalities are among 
IEDs’ basic properties. IEDs contain various protective functionalities [4]. The devices 
are located on the secondary side of an electric circuit and the primary values of a electric 
network are converted to secondary values with instrument transformers [11] or sensors. 
Recording makes it possible to investigate fault afterwards. IEDs are used in switch gear 
controlling, and they can be used in local and remote control.  
The following subsections describes IEDs as protective devices, although IEDs’ have also 
other functionalities, such as communication. The first subsection describes the protec-
tion scheme, which defines the protection principles of the distribution network. After 
introducing the protection principles, the fault diagnostic, overcurrent protection and 
earth fault protection are described each in their own subsections. At the end of the sec-
tion, IED device REF615 and its functionalities are introduced. 
3.1.1 Distribution network protection 
The main principle of distribution network protection is to detect the abnormal state of 
the network. It is important to detect faults fast. Depending on the type of fault, faults can 
be harmful to network equipment, operation and network environment. In addition to op-
erating fast, protection should only operate when faults occur, remove only the faulted 
part from network and be structured in hierarchical manner. Standards provide the mini-
mum requirements but with extended features outages can be reduced to minimum [8].  
An important aspect in distribution network protection is to recognize operation environ-
ment. One key factor is the network type. The network type can be cable or overhead line. 
In cable networks the faults are different than in overhead line network, which affects to 
the protection principles. For example auto-reclosing is not used in cable networks, but 
networks which include cable and overhead line uses auto-reclosing. [12-14] 
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Distribution network protection should fulfill certain aspects. Protection should cover the 
protective area in addition to being selective, sensitive, fast, simple and reliable. Other 
aspects are easy to use, testing and cost-effectiveness. Protection is selective when pro-
tective device operates to faults on its protection zone [11]. Sensitivity and fast operation 
minimize damages for network and environment. Protection should be possible to test on 
its location and cost-effective from investment costs.  
In Finland SFS 6001 provides the requirements for protection. SFS 6001 is the standard 
that covers high-voltages electrical installations [15]. SFS 6001 combines the two inter-
national standards EN 61936-1 and EN 50522. SFS 6001 requires that the high voltage 
network protection must cover certain aspects. Protection must implement overcurrent 
and earth faults. The protection should also cover thermal effect, over and under voltage, 
and low frequency. The standard provides fault durations and allowed touch voltages for 
earth fault. Earth fault protection must have back-up protection, whereas for overcurrent 
back-up protection is optional. Distribution network companies need to fulfil the standard 
requirements in the network protection.   
In distribution networks protective devices are typically located at the substations [8]. 
Line breakers alongside the medium voltage feeder are rare [12-14]. Today, automated 
fault indicators are added to the feeders in order to attain better information about fault 
current flow to estimate fault locations. Fault indicators are able to detect faults, but they 
are not capable of clearing fault as the protective relays [16].  
Substations are key instrumental in electricity networks. At distribution network substa-
tions, high voltage is transferred to medium voltage and network is divided into feeders 
[8]. Figure 9 below presents the basic model of substation medium voltage side. The fig-
ure illustrates the primary transformer, two outgoing medium voltage feeders, one high 
voltage circuit breaker and three medium voltage circuit breakers. The circuit breakers 
are marked with green squares. Substations include also another switch gear instead of 
just circuit breakers, but other equipment are not presented in the figure. The substation 
medium voltage level is typically considered to have one input direction from primary 
transformer or transformers to medium voltage network [8]. When the amount of DG 
increases, medium voltage feeders can also serve as input feeders. When substation has 
several input feeders, it also affects to protection. In this thesis, distribution network sub-
stations are viewed as radially operated with one feeding direction. 
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Figure 9. Simplified substation structure. 
Figure 9 can be divided into different protection zones. In the figure the substation’s pro-
tection zones are marked with dashed lines. The protection areas and principles depend 
on the network topology and the feeding directions. This section concentrates on busbar 
and feeder protection. The feeders are regarded as areas beginning from outgoing feeder 
current transformer until the end of line. The current transformers are located at beginning 
of feeders. Busbar protection area is between the primary transformer and outgoing feed-
ers’ current transformers [11]. 
DSOs’ ideas about busbar and feeder protection varies depending on company. The bus-
bar protection is also known as transformer protection. The busbar protection is thought 
to include overcurrent, earth fault, over voltage and under voltage protection functions, 
where over and under voltage is not always tripping. Feeder protection includes overcur-
rent protection, several earth fault protection functions and inrush detection in overcur-
rent. Another protection functions that DSOs mentioned were arc and conductor break 
protection. Selectivity is provided with constant-time-delay and blocking message. 
Blocking message implementation varies from hardwire connection to GOOSE message. 
The time delay is planned so that busbar protective device is not allowed to operate before 
feeder protective devices operate. Feeder earth fault back-up protection is possible to do 
with external back up protection relay, busbar protective device or manually by system 
operator. Overcurrent back-up protection is done with the busbar protective device or arc 
protection device. Auto-reclosing is used in networks which are overhead lines or com-
bination of overhead line and cable. In cable networks, auto-reclosing is not used. De-
layed reclosing is applied automatically or manually. The same protection settings are 
tend to use at different feeders in urban networks were network topology configuration 
may have a lot of different variations. This makes the network operation easier even 
though at some feeders protection could be more sensitive. [12-14] 
3.1.2 Fault diagnostics 
A disturbance recording is often the only way to find out a reason, why an IED protection 
has operated, if the protection has operated an unexpected way. In addition disturbance 
recordings can also be used to network condition management, customer service, elec-
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tricity quality management [17] such as detecting harmonics or sub-harmonics. In cus-
tomer service system operator can prove with disturbance recordings that there has been 
a normal fault in the system and customer is not rightful to refund in electricity distribu-
tion bill [12]. When planning the recording of events in distribution network there should 
be considered type of event to record, sampling frequency, limitations and errors, trigger-
ing, length of record, needed analog and binary channels [18].  
In JE-Siirto, the disturbance recordings are seen as parts of outage management and net-
work management. Outage management is a process to return the network from the emer-
gency state to normal state and network management consists of network planning, cus-
tomer service, real time operation and control, and other factors which are considered as 
DSOs’ tasks [19]. In outage management JE-Siirto uses disturbance recordings during 
fault situations in order to understand the reason of a fault, because of SCADA is not 
capable to present as detailed fault measurements from primary process. In Elenia and 
TSV, disturbance recordings are studied more after the fault is cleared from the network 
to explain reasons for protection functions operations. [12-14] 
The disturbance recorder can be used for recording transients, short and long term faults, 
and normal operation of the distribution network. The data from the recordings can be 
analyzed after faults, and then used for improving the network reliability [18]. 
In order to being able to record fault situations to the disturbance recordings, trigger set-
tings are important. There are several triggers to choose from. Recording trigger option 
can be either duration or edge based. In duration based triggers, the purpose is to keep 
recording through the whole fault. Edge based triggers keep recording for fixed period of 
time. Triggering method affect to how well an event is recorded. 
Figure 10 below illustrates an edge-based recording with a fixed length. Recording length 
consists of a pre-triggering and post-triggering time frame. Pre- and post-triggering divide 
the recording into two areas. The pre-triggering area records events and measurements 
before the triggering. Post-triggering area is the area after the triggering conditions are 
fulfilled. The post-triggering area orders the recording length.  
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Figure 10. Disturbance recording [18]. 
Another method for record disturbance recording is durational triggering. In duration trig-
gering, recording is divided into time intervals pre-trigger, during triggering and post-
trigger. Recording length depends on during triggering time interval [18]. During trigger-
ing interval means the area between the triggering conditions are fulfilled and the trigger-
ing conditions are not fulfilled anymore.  
IED fault diagnostic is typically collected to Common format for transient data exchange 
(COMTRADE). The COMTRADE standard part 24 describes format for information 
storage of transient waveform and event data in power systems [20]. The information is 
in a form that can be stored in physical medias.  
3.1.3 Overcurrent protection 
The purpose of overcurrent protection is to prevent damage to conductors and to isolate 
the faulted feeder from the network. Overcurrent is dangerous to network equipment and 
environment. The protective device should detect these faults fast [21]. Protection should 
detect faults, but not operate in normal load condition. 
The overcurrent, which the protective device must detect, are overloading and short cir-
cuit faults. Overloading means a situation in which the load current exceeds the rated 
current of the conductor. Short circuit faults are phase-to-phase and three-phase faults 
[22]. The fault current root mean square value can be kilo amperes in short circuit faults. 
In overload situations the current is near the normal operation current, but safe operation 
limits are exceeded [8]. The overcurrent cause heating damage. 
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In overcurrent protection, the protection should operate fast for high fault current, detect 
the lowest fault current and notice overloading. In overcurrent protection configuration, 
the current limits are gotten from rated currents. Rated currents at the feeder are three-
phase short circuit in the beginning of the feeder, two-phase short circuit at the end of the 
feeder, and maximum load current [8]. Rated currents at busbar are three-phase short 
circuit and maximum load current. Difficulties for setting the protection level arise, if the 
topology of the network changes [11]. DSOs have possibility to analyze fault currents 
with NIS and DMS. [12-14] 
Overcurrent protection current is typically set in a way that it has different current pro-
tection stages. In the protective device, there can be from two to three different stages of 
overcurrent protection [12-14]. The stages are set for the purpose of attaining different 
levels of sensitivity and operation speed. One solution is to set one of the function’s op-
eration current in between of maximum load current and smallest rated short circuit cur-
rent. [8]. A good operation effective current value, for high current protection function, 
is two kilo amperes root mean square value. Protection function with highest rated current 
can be set to operate without time delay, but in networks, which include one or several 
transformers with high rated power, inrush current must be considered [12].  
Overcurrent protection fault currents can be calculated with formulas 1 and 2 presented 
below. Formula 1 is for calculating three-phase short circuit current. In formula 1, Ik is 
three-phase short circuit current, whereas Uph equals phase voltage before fault. Ztot stands 
for total impedance of the network before fault [8].   
 
𝐼𝑘 =
𝑈𝑝ℎ
𝑍𝑡𝑜𝑡
 (1) 
Two-phase short circuit current is calculated with formula 2, where Ik2 stands for two-
phase fault current. Ik equals three-phase short circuit current. 
 𝐼𝑘2 =
√3
2
∗ 𝐼𝑘 (2) 
Selectivity can be ensured with operation delay at the protection stages. Operation delay 
is used to prevent miss operation of protection stages and to ensure selective operation 
when different protection devices are involved. Operation delay can be either constant- 
or inverse-time-delay. Constant-time-delay is a common setting in the distribution net-
works in Finland. In inverse-time-delay operation delay for specific current values is got-
ten from inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) curve. In IDMS curve the operation time 
is dependent on current value [23].  
In order to choosing operation delays, there are a few basic principles which are needed 
to consider. These principles are the operation time of protection device, operation time 
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and arc time of the circuit breaker, and diversity in protection device operation time [11]. 
Also, operation delays depend on the network equipment current rating [12-14].  
The hierarchical structure of the protection needs time delay to receive selectivity, be-
cause a protective device should operate to faults on its protection are in the first place. 
When protection is hierarchical, the upper levels of protection devices can also operate 
as back-up protection for lower level devices. A lower level protection device must have 
shorter operation delay than higher level protection, to ensure faster operation of lower 
level protection, to its protection zone faults. Although, at the same time this brings a side 
effect that the operation time for highest fault currents is the longest [11].  
With fast overcurrent protection functions, such as instant operation functions, time delay 
is not a possible solution to achieve selectivity, because distribution network protection 
is hierarchical. Blocking is used, to reach selectivity, with high operation speeds. When 
blocking method is used, the protection device closest to the fault sends a blocking signal 
to the back-up protection device’s fast protection function [11]. The blocking signal is 
sent only if fault is found on the protection area and blocking should not block back-up 
protection, so that in a case of circuit breaker fault, back-up protection does not operate. 
Traditional way to implement blocking functionality is hardwire connection between pro-
tection devices. IEC 61850 have brought possibility to send GOOSE blocking message 
via Ethernet data link layer, which is considered as faster way than hardwire connection 
[24]. 
3.1.4 Earth fault protection 
In addition to being the most common fault type, earth faults are hazardous to the envi-
ronment. In earth faults the fault currents are small, when compared to short circuit faults, 
and fault current is in between 5A and 100A in unearthed systems, which makes it diffi-
cult to detect the fault during earth faults [8]. Protection sensitivity may be a problem in 
earth fault protection. High resistance faults are especially difficult to detect because of 
small currents, which causes problems to protection sensitivity. [25].  
The grounding method affects to the fault current flow [21]. In unearthed systems fault 
current flows through the network capacitances, because the network does not have con-
nection to ground besides at fault location. During the earth fault, fault current flows to 
the ground through fault resistance in fault point [8]. Fault current flows back to the feed-
ers through the capacitance between the line and earth. This subsection concentrates on 
unearthed system. 
Fault current can be calculated with formula 3. In formula 3, 𝜔 means angular frequency, 
C0 means total network phase capacitance between line and ground, Rf means fault re-
sistance, and Uph stands for phase voltage before fault. Fault current is the current that 
flows from the line to the ground, but is not detected by the protective device [11]. 
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𝐼𝑓 =
3𝜔𝐶0
√1 + (3𝜔𝑅𝑓)2
∗ 𝑈𝑝ℎ (3) 
In the distribution network, earth fault protection is not based on fault current measure-
ment. Typical measured factors have been a residual voltage and a residual current from 
fundamental frequencies. The disadvantage of using the fundamental frequencies is the 
lack of sensitivity in high resistance faults [25]. Other possible measured factors are har-
monic components of current and voltage, and transient currents [8]. 
A common solution for detecting earth fault is a residual current. Residual current is a 
part of the earth fault current, which flows back to the substation. Residual current is 
either calculated or measured from phasor currents. Residual current is measured with a 
three-phase current transformer that detects imbalances between phasor currents.  
In an unearthed network, residual current can be calculated with formula 4. In formula 4, 
C0 is total capacitance of a phase between line and ground, C0j is the phase capacitance 
between line and ground of faulted feeder’s and If is the fault current [11]. 
 
𝐼0 =
𝐶0 − 𝐶0𝑗
𝐶0
∗ 𝐼𝑓 (4) 
Residual voltage is used with residual current in earth fault detection. Residual voltage is 
between the ground and the wye point of the substation primary transformer. Residual 
voltage can be calculated with formula 5, where Uph is the phase voltage, C0 is the capac-
itance between line and ground, and Rf is the fault resistance [8].  
 
𝑈0 =
𝑈𝑝ℎ
√1 + (3𝜔𝐶0𝑅𝐹)2
 (5) 
The requirements for earth fault protection come from touch potentials, which are pro-
vided by SFS 6001. The earth fault current flows through the grounding resistance. To-
gether, the fault current and fault resistance causes an earthing voltage between the 
ground and the energized object [8]. The voltage, which is possible to touch by animal or 
person is called touch potential.  
Formula 6 presents earthing voltage. In formula, UE is earthing voltage, If is the fault 
current, and RE is the grounding resistance. 
 UE = If * RE (6) 
Earthing voltage is harmful for the environment [8]. Figure 11 below presents a scenario 
in which a person touches a distribution transformer during earth fault. 
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Figure 11. Earth fault voltage [8, 15]. 
In Figure 11, fault is located in a insulator of the transformer [8]. The blue curve repre-
sents potential during fault [15]. The person feels the touch voltage between the ground 
and the transformer, as the fault current flows through the person. In distribution trans-
formers, the ground is often connected to the same ground as low voltage network neutral 
[8]. During earth faults, fault potential is transferred to low voltage network which causes 
dangerous potential in metallic covers of the electric appliances at low voltage network 
[15]. 
SFS 6001 restricts the approved earth fault voltages and fault durations [8]. SFS 6001 
does not give restrictions or requirements for fault resistance along the high voltage line 
[12]. The approved earth voltage is calculated from touch voltages with formula 7 [15]. 
Secondary substation earthing requirements depend on the formula 7, when low voltage 
network is connected to the same ground as the distribution transformer. 
 UE ≤ k * UTP (7) 
In formula 7, UE is earthing voltage, k is the multiplier for earthing conditions, and UTp is 
touch voltage. The value for k is typically two in Finland [8]. High k values are for badly 
conducting surfaces, such as rock or gravel. With higher k values there are conditions that 
need to be fulfilled. These conditions include external earthings. Higher k values allow 
higher earth potential during a fault. 
In earth fault detection time delay is determined by SFS 6001. Time delay is depends on 
touch voltages which occur during faults [8]. The standard provides a logarithmic scale. 
Extra groundings can be used to improve grounding conditions, and in this way time-
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delay can be extended. Table 1 presents the accepted touch voltage durations in earth 
fault. 
Table 1. Time delays and touch voltages from standard SFS 6001 [8]. 
 
By combining Table 1 with formulas 6 and 7, it is possible to determine operation delay 
for earth fault protection operation, and the requirements for transformer grounding con-
ditions. With k value two, and 0,4s time delay, the highest earthing voltage that is allowed, 
is 2*280V = 560V calculated with formula 6. The required grounding resistance is then 
calculated with formula 7, 560V/50A = 11,2Ω, where the fault current was assumed to be 
50A [8]. 
DSOs use different protection applications in earth fault protection. The most used pro-
tection functions are non-directional and directional earth fault protection, admittance 
based protection and transient earth fault protection. The settings of protective devices 
depend on the network and instrument transformers accuracy. Protection is done so that 
the same values are possible to use in different feeders or so that feeders have own pro-
tection settings which are suitable for particular feeder. Having same protection functions 
in the whole operated distribution network, makes network operation easier, whereas in-
dividual settings provide more sensitive protection. Busbar earth fault protection can be 
done with residual voltage with or without breaker operation. In some occasions earth 
fault protection at busbar is done remotely by the system operator. The length of the net-
work may also change and the settings need to fulfil those needs. [12-14] 
3.1.5 REF 615 
REF615 is a part of ABB’s 615 series. The device is meant for feeder protection and 
control. It can also be used for busbar protection in radially operated networks [26]. 
REF615 includes different protection functionalities depending on the model. There are 
twelve different models, from which two have the full number of options [23]. 
REF615 provides a large number of protection functionalities for different purposes. 
Overcurrent, earth fault, and residual voltage protection functions for feeder protection 
are described in Table 2 below. 
 
 
Delay [s] 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
UTP 390 280 215 160 132 120 110 110
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Table 2. REF 615 protection functions [23].  
Fault type Description 
ABBs IEC 61850 based 
name 
Overcur-
rent 
Three-phase non-directional overcurrent 
protection 
PHxPTOC 
Overcur-
rent 
Three-phase directional overcurrent pro-
tection 
DPHxPDOC 
Earth fault Non-directional earth-fault protection EFxPTOC 
Earth fault Directional earth-fault protection DEFxPDEF 
Earth fault Transient/intermittent earth-fault protec-
tion 
INTRPTEF 
Earth fault Harmonics-based earth-fault protection HAEFPTOC 
Earth fault Wattmetric-based protection WPWDE 
Earth fault Admittance-based earth fault protection EFPADM 
Earth fault Multifrequency admittance-based protec-
tion 
MFADPSDE 
Overvolt-
age 
Residual overvoltage protection ROVPTOP 
 
PHxPTOC and DPHxPDOC overcurrent protection functions are meant for one-, two- 
and three-phase overcurrent and short-circuit protection. PHxPTOC is not capable of de-
tection fault current direction, whereas DPHxPDOC is [23]. PHxPTOC functions meas-
ure the current, and compare it to the set limit. In DPHxPDOC, the function current and 
voltage values are measured and compared to the set limits. The function also detects the 
phase angel between the current and the voltage. If the set limits are exceeded, the pro-
tection function starts the timer before tripping. 
EFxPTOC and DEFxPDEF earth fault functions are meant for non-directional and direc-
tional earth fault protection. EFxPTOC is for non-directional protection, and it uses meas-
ured or calculated residual current. The function detects residual current, and if the set 
limit current is exceeded, the protection function starts the timer [23]. If the set limit is 
still exceeded after pre-defined operation delay, the protection function starts. 
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DEFxPDEF is for directional protection for feeders. The function calculates or uses meas-
ured residual current and voltages. Protection can be set to follow the residual current and 
voltage values, and the phase angle between these values. Another possibility is to meas-
ure the resistive and capacitive part from the current. In the directional earth-fault function 
settings the earthing of the distribution network has a major impact on protection settings. 
The grounding method impacts on the phase angle between the residual current and the 
residual voltage. 
INTRPTEF is an earth-fault protection function for permanent and intermittent earth 
faults with directional protection ability. The function detects transients from the residual 
current and the residual voltage signals [23]. INTRPTEF has two different operation 
logics. Transient setting is meant for all kinds of earth faults in which intermittent setting 
is for faults in cable networks. In the transient logic, function follows the residual voltage 
value. Protection operates when the set residual voltage is exceeded longer than the set 
operation time, and reset delay time. Intermittent logic follows residual voltage value. 
The protection function operates, if set of transients exceed counters limit and time delay 
is exceeded. 
EFPADM is a neutral admittance based earth fault protection function, which has a good 
sensitivity [23]. The protection function is based on neutral admittance which is calcu-
lated from the residual current and voltage values. The steady state admittance of the 
distribution network is the sum of capacitive and resistive parts of feeders. Steady state 
admittances are set on an admittance plane. Measured admittance is compared to the ad-
mittance plane. If the plane edge is exceeded, the protection operates depending on time 
delay [17]. The protection setting depends on the network earthing method. 
MFADPSDE is multifrequency admittance protection function, which is based on mul-
tifrequency neutral admittance. When admittance protection is based on fundamental fre-
quencies, the multifrequency admittance protection measures fundamental frequencies 
and harmonic components [17]. The protection is capable to detect earth faults and inter-
mittent earth faults. 
3.2 Distribution system operation 
Distribution system operation has developed from the local manual control of power sys-
tems to centralized computer aided remote controlling of the systems [27]. The remote 
controlling and monitoring software SCADA and DMS have taken the control center. 
These systems provide automation controlling possibilities, as well as a general view of 
the process. The overall view is necessary for accomplishing a safe, economical and reli-
able system operation. This section describes power system control and monitoring. 
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The simplest way to operate a process is to meter measurable unit and control actuating 
device. When the number of processes and devices increase, process information is nec-
essary to collect into one place to get an overall view of the system [27]. The good overall 
view enables reliable control of the system. In the power system, processes can be geo-
graphically widely spread. If all processes are presented in one control center, the whole 
system can be controlled from one place, and local control is not necessary.  
Centralized control centers group information that can be used in monitoring and control 
of the process. Earlier in power system control, the systems overview was built on mimic 
boards where all processes were presented in schematic model. These mimic boards dis-
played systems signals, disconnectors, breakers, feeders and other factors from the sys-
tem. If the system was modified, the mimic board had to be rebuilt. The mosaic structure 
of the mimic boards made it possible to reconstruct the system picture in the control center 
[27]. With large systems, system models became rather complex and idea of a good over-
all view disappeared. Computers introduced an alternative for complex mimic boards. 
Computers entered to power system control rooms in the 1960s. In the beginning com-
puters only controlled signals. When computers began to present parts of the system with 
visual display unit (VDU), mimic boards became less needed [27]. At the same time, the 
role of the control center operator changed. Computers started to analyze and provide 
information from the state of the network. The operator was able to use given information 
in the decision making process.  
The development of system monitoring brought more possibilities for system operation. 
In distribution management, the key factors are quality, safety and economical operation 
[27]. Quality is often regarded as voltage and frequency quality, the power system has to 
be safe for its environment and the operation of the system needs to be economically 
reasonable. 
Today, the distribution network operator controls and monitors network operations in real 
time. Operator operation also includes short-term planning and reporting. The distribution 
network operator uses DMS and SCADA systems to accomplish its tasks [19].  
3.2.1 SCADA 
SCADA is an automation control and monitoring system, that is used in electricity net-
work operation and in industries, which have a significant use of automation. SCADA 
offers the possibility to control large automated systems locally or remotely in real time 
[19]. While understanding SCADA systems as a part of the distribution automation sys-
tem, it is important to keep in mind that industrial processes are different from distribution 
network processes, because distribution network processes are geographically wide 
spread. 
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SCADA adds remote control and monitoring to distribution network operation. SCADA 
enables the operation and controlling of the distribution system remotely and locally [19]. 
Typically, SCADA communicates with remote terminal units (RTUs) in the distribution 
network. RTUs operate as data concentrators and communication units, and are located 
at substations and feeders in the distribution network. RTUs send information of primary 
process to the distribution network control center and vise versa. From RTUs, SCADA 
collects primary process information, which is further used in other IT systems.  
The basic, modern SCADA system includes standard functionalities. Standard function-
alities can be divided to the basic process functions, which are collecting data, monitoring 
collected data, event processing and controlling [19]. The process information of the 
standard functions is stored, and the process information can be accessed for later analy-
sis. Standard functions are described next. 
SCADA collects system data in different formats. The type of status, energy and meas-
ured values depend on the device and the instance. Status indications are typically sent as 
a single or double indication. The single indication has the stages on and off, whereas 
double indication has four stages: on, two middle positions and off [19]. Measured values 
can be digital or analog. Energy values are traditionally sent as a pulse counter values. 
The pulse counter values are sent as pulses in time intervals, and each pulse has a pre-
defined value. 
Processes have to be monitored, because the mere data collection functionality is not 
enough to tell the state of the system for the system operator. In the process monitoring, 
data values are collected, and new collected values can be compared with the previous 
data values. Limits can be set for monitored values, and exceeding a limit generates an 
event that informs the system operator about exceeding of a limit in the process. SCADA 
can also follow trends and set alarms, if operation is not satisfactory [19]. For example, 
SCADA could allow 7% change in the voltage measurement in a minute. 
Processes can be controlled by the system operator or the automated functions. Control-
ling functions can be divided into four categories. These categories are individual device 
control, control messages to regulating equipment, sequential control and automatic con-
trol [19]. Individual control means applying control action to an individual device. The 
control message to regulating equipment refers to a message sent to a device, which starts 
an operation sequence that may include controlling of other devices. The sequential con-
trol means the completing of an automatically created list of commands by the operator. 
The automated control is the only fully automated type of controlling. The automated 
control is a set of pre-defined acts that begin with particular event triggering.  
The process data is collected and stored in SCADA. In real time monitoring, old primary 
process values are updated with new values. Historical data can be used to serve data 
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analysis [19]. Historical data analysis can be used in many functions, such as system load 
planning, performance audition and post-fault analysis.  
Besides SCADA functions an important aspect of the SCADA system is its performance. 
Communication speed is an important factor in SCADA system performance. In early 
SCADAs the transfer speed was critical and the protocols were designed in a way in 
which every bit counted [19]. Today, the bandwidth is still a critical factor, but new tech-
nologies have made it possible to poll the process data more frequently, which enable to 
monitor the process closer to real time.  
In communication, polling means scanning of a system. In SCADA system, data polling 
has two main types, which are cyclic and report-by-exception [19]. In cyclic data polling, 
measures and indications are scanned in different cycles. Important data points are 
scanned more often than less important. In report-by-exception polling, SCADA server 
polls the point cyclic, but the point answers with data, if exception level is exceeded. 
Polling type affects to response times in SCADA system. With cyclic data polling re-
sponse times are constant and communication channels usage can be optimized by polling 
important data points more frequently than less important. And also, during disturbances 
the cyclic data pulling keeps constant, whereas report-by-exception data polling provides 
fast response times.  
Restrictions for data polling frequency comes from bandwidth, which gives limits for 
how close to real time the system can be monitored. With help of priority the problems 
with bandwidth can be left out. The priority is design in a way that point with highest 
priority is pulled at first and the second most important point after the first. There can be 
several priority layers in the system. This kind of priority order provides good response 
time for essential information. 
3.2.2 Distribution management system 
DMS is a computer system, which presents the whole view of the distribution network 
for network operator. DMS combines information from various information systems. 
With information from those systems, DMS provide functions and applications to effi-
cient network operation [8]. 
The network operator’s operations can be divided into four main areas: topology super-
vision, restoration, scheduled outage planning and reconfiguration [28]. Supervision in-
volves topology supervision from which basic tasks are switching state and network con-
figuration monitoring. The restoration is fault management, which consists pre- and post-
fault operations. The outage planning includes switching planning, customer service, out-
age reporting and executing the scheduled plan. Reconfiguration means reconfiguration 
of the distribution network, in which the network is configured to more optimal state or 
from non-accepted state to accepted state. 
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DMS system provides applications to reliable network operation for network operation. 
Figure 12 below presents a DMS system structure [29]. 
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Figure 12. DMS structure [29]. 
Figure 12 contains five layers. Layers present the parts that build a functional DMS sys-
tem. Layers are described next. 
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In Figure 12, the top layer is user interface (UI). UI presents the system on control center 
monitors and is the interface between the system and the operator. UI is important part of 
DMS from the system operator point of view, because UI presents the distribution net-
work topology, DMS applications, alarms and other notifications for the system operator 
[30]. Figure 13 below presents a snap shot from DMS UI in which is presented network 
state and topology, network component symbols, measurements and geographical names.  
 
Figure 13. Distribution network presented in ABB DMS. 
Application layer functions provide support for the network operator in DMS. Applica-
tion layer functions are basic functions, which are applied in network operation. Functions 
are classified into three groups: network state monitoring, fault management and network 
operation planning [29]. State monitoring includes functions that provide information for 
building picture from the network. Fault management group contains applications which 
help in fault situations and informing customers. Network operation planning include 
functions to maintain the network and optimizing the network operation to minimizing 
total costs. 
Modelling and calculation layer offer information for the operator’s actions. DMS in-
cludes several modelling and computation technique functions. These functions are net-
work modelling, real-time stage analysis, load model and load flow calculations, state 
estimation and load forecasting, fault analysis, protection operation analysis, reliability 
calculations, and blackout costs. These functions are at the back ground of working ap-
plications [30]. 
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Data interface layer provides protocols and programs for DMS. Provided protocols and 
programs are for accessing data sources of various computer systems. Protocols, such as 
OPC, are used for accessing the information of other computer systems. In some occa-
sions accessing other systems data, an interoperability software is needed in between the 
data source and DMS [29]. Intermediary files also co-operate in between the data source 
and DMS system. Intermediary means file which is created, updated and used as data 
source by the DMS or other programs.  
On the bottom layer are data sources and external systems. This layer includes all pro-
grams, devices and databases, which DMS uses. Data sources are accessed with data in-
terface layer functions [29]. The benefit of accessing data from various programs, and not 
building one program with all functionalities, splits the system, and makes the system 
better scalable. 
The role of DMS and SCADA depends on DSO. In interviewed distribution companies, 
the role of these systems varies. A one way of using DMS and SCADA, is a way were all 
network components are controlled from SCADA, and DMS’s role is to show the current 
network topology and state. The other way is to use both systems in the network config-
uration management. In this type of using SCADA and DMS systems, the network de-
vices with remote operation capability are operated from SCADA, and devices that are 
operated manually the state of a network equipment is changed from DMS. [12-14] 
3.2.3 ABB MicroSCADA Pro 
MicroSCADA Pro is ABB’s product family and it includes SYS600, DMS600 and 
SYS600C products [31]. MicroSCADA Pro SYS 600 is SCADA system, which works 
on Windows platform. DMS600 is DMS system, which provides network management 
functionalities. SYS600C is industrial computer with SCADA installed. This chapter de-
scribes ABB MicroSCADA Pro SYS600 and DMS600. 
SYS600 is automation product to substation automation and network control. SYS600 
architecture is presented in Figure 14 below. The hearth of SYS600 is a system server. 
The system server manages all the functionalities provided by SYS600 [32]. In each sys-
tem server, there is a one base system that does central data processing. Base system 
consists of one or several system applications. The base system consists of applications, 
system services and SCIL engine. One base system can be installed on one computer or 
distributed into several computers. 
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Figure 14. SYS600 architecture [32]. 
SYS600 Application provides functions of SYS600. SYS600 functions are added to ap-
plication with application objects. There are various application objects which are process 
object, event handling object, scales, data object, time channel, event channel, logging 
profile, event object, free type object and variable object [32]. Application objects’ state 
is defined with attributes. Attributes contain dynamic and static data of the object. 
In communication, SYS600 supports several protocols. All modern SCADA protocols 
are supported including IEC 104 and DNP3 [32]. Other supported protocols are IEC 
61850, OPC, IEC 61107, Modbus, IEC 101, IEC 103 and LonWork.  
The DMS600 has two main programs. DMS600 Network Editor and DMS600 Work-
station. Both programs have individual UI [31]. DMS600 Workstation is for network op-
erators and provides DMS functions. DMS600 uses SYS600 to present distribution man-
agement view [33]. In DMS600, DMS and SCADA functionalities are integrated. This 
make it possible to control and supervise network topology from same view. Network 
Editor is for creating and editing the distribution network. 
DMS600 program contains application functions depending on license. Available appli-
cation functions are presented in Figure 15 below.  
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Figure 15. MicroSCADA DMS600 functions [34]. 
For data interfaces DMS600 provides several protocols, programs, database and interme-
diary files. For DMS and SCADA interface OPC Data Access or SCIL API is used [34]. 
OPC interface make it possible to integrate different vendor’s SCADA to DMS600. Syn-
chronization between SCADA and DMS is done through OPC Data Access interface. 
AMI configurations are done with configuration file. Connection to relational database is 
done with Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) and Data Source Name (DSN) defini-
tions. 
3.3 Smart metering 
Today, the electricity metering infrastructure can be seen as extension of SCADA. Me-
tering systems can be integrated as a part of distribution network operation in low voltage 
network fault indication, location and isolation for example [35]. This chapter reveals 
customer side metering. 
JE-Siirto, Elenia and TSV thought that low voltage automation has important role in dis-
tribution operation and management. All of the three DSOs were thinking that smart me-
tering has important role or would have in customer service today. Customers interrup-
tions are easier to solve with help of AMI information. Smart meters offer information 
about customers fault and predefined alarms make fault solving faster. From three com-
panies only TSV had no possibility to do remote requests to smart meters from control 
center. In Elenia smart meters’ information is also used in medium voltage fault manage-
ment. [12-14] 
Energy metering has been used since the 1870s. The first metering systems were intro-
duced during the 1990s. Today, electricity meters provide same functionalities as energy 
meters in the 1870s, but metering systems provide functionalities that can be seen as ex-
pansion of SCADA. Hourly metering became mandatory for DSOs in Finland in end of 
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the year 2013. In the 2013 DSOs were required to install meters with hourly energy meas-
urement to at least 80% of customers [36]. 
Electricity metering systems are know as Automatic Meter Reading (AMR) and Ad-
vanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) technology. AMR metering brought remote meter 
reading to electricity metering and reduced the costs that meter reading brought earlier. 
AMI system is seen as next step from AMR system, by utilizing two-way communication 
for operator. In AMI system operator has possibility to send commands for meter. For 
customer, two-way communication brings better possibilities to affect one’s energy bill 
by energy usage and tariffs [7]. AMI system structure is described next. 
AMI technology is divides into four parts. These parts are smart meter, metering data 
management system (MDMS) and communication network. Smart meter is customer 
level metering device with communication and metering properties [37]. Smart meter has 
ability to send data and receive commands, which are transferred trough communication 
network. Communication network provides two-way communication for the AMI sys-
tem, in which data concentrators present the key role as links between smart meters and 
head-end system. Data concentrators are communication units, which collect data from 
smart meters and forward the data to head-end system. Head-end system processes the 
data and forwards information to MDMS, or sends system operator commands to data 
concentrators. MDMS is information system, which manages, processes and stores me-
tering data [7]. This section uses AMI system naming from metering infrastructure. 
AMI system is for LV network management. The system structure can be divided into 
four layers. These layers are infrastructure, basic functions, reporting features and applied 
AMI [38]. Infrastructure level contains metering devices, MDMS, data concentrators and 
communication network. Basic AMI system functionalities are customer billing, load 
management, energy settlement and balance settlement. Reporting layer functionalities 
are energy usage information, interruption reports and energy saving. Applied AMI pro-
vide possibilities to expanded use of metering data. Examples from applied AMI are net-
work management, fault locating, power quality monitoring and customer service. Ap-
plied features make possible to use distribution network more feasible way [35].  
Typical AMI system topology is centralized system. Other AMI system topologies are 
distributed and fully distributed systems. Centralized system is presented in Figure 16 
below. In centralized architecture, measuring information is collected from smart meters 
to data concentrators that are access points to smart meters [39]. Data concentrators for-
ward smart meter data through communication channel to centralized MDMS. From 
MDMS distribution management system pulls AMI data. 
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Figure 16. AMI system with centralized MDMS [40, 41]. 
In a centralized architecture the MDMS is located in a single server. The single server 
makes it easy to do requests to MDMS, but it is poorly scalable. Scalability issues occur 
with large metering systems in which the amount of data increases [39]. Large amount of 
the transferred data may cause bottle necks in communication as in data processing, which 
increase time delay in the system. Problems with bottle necks increase when AMI data is 
needed in real time, such as in fault management. Also, communication resources are lost 
when transferring all data to MDMS, because information travels long distances, but in-
formation is not necessary needed [40]. 
In decentralized topology, MDMS is distributed into local MDMS servers. Local MDMS 
collects data, processes information and stores data from concentrators. Central MDMS 
collects the data from local storages when the data is needed. Decentralized topology is 
presented in Figure 17 below. 
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Figure 17. Distributed AMI system [40, 41].  
In distributed architecture as in Figure 17, MDMS servers collect data from specific re-
gions. In this architecture communication bottle necks are avoided, because data requests 
can be send to specific regions, which decreases amount of sent data [40]. Negative side 
is time delay which is result from pulling the data from decentralized servers. If decen-
tralized MDMS system do data processing too, central MDMS saves time in processing 
time.  
In addition to centralized and distributed architectures, there is also fully distributed ar-
chitecture. In fully distributed architecture, local MDMS servers handle the most of the 
occurred situations locally. Operations of distributed servers are only reported to central 
station [40]. The benefit of fully distributed system is reduced costs in communication.  
In communication smart meters use DLMS/COSEM protocol. Before DLMS/COSEM 
the field of low voltage automation was suffering from the amount of protocols when 
every vendor had their own protocol for communication [42]. DLMS/COSEM protocol 
is described later.  
3.4 Communication protocols and standards 
Protocols and standards act important role in distribution network communication. This 
chapter presents few fundamental standards which are used in distribution automation. 
IEC 61850 is communication standard, which defines communication protocols. IEC 
60870-5-104 (IEC 104) is protocol for communication from distribution control center to 
substations and to other remote operated automation. Section also presents OPC and 
DLMS/COSEM standards. 
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To understand standards and protocols, this section describes object-oriented design and 
OSI model in the beginning. Information models of protocols and standards, which are 
described in this section, are based on object-oriented design. Communication architec-
ture of protocols can be described with help of OSI model which is standardized network 
architecture model.  
3.4.1 Object-oriented design 
Object-oriented design is widely used in programming. Information models of the proto-
cols and standards, which are described in this section, use object-oriented design in data 
models. To understanding standards’ and protocols’ information models better, this sub-
section revels the key terms. 
In object-oriented design it is important to understand the terms class and object. Class is 
the instance, which defines the attributes and methods [43]. Methods present functionality 
of the class and are interfaces to access attributes of the class. Class creates logical struc-
ture for the object and standardized way to access the data from the object. In other words, 
class is a way to capsulate information into logical form. Object or objects are created 
from class. Objects that are created from the same class have same methods and attributes, 
but attribute values may be different. Different attribute values create different states for 
objects. Figure 18 below presents class from which two objects are created. Both objects 
have the methods getBookTitle, setBookTitle and getIdentity, which are implemented by 
the class. Objects attributes bookTitle and identity are accessed with methods. 
Class: Book
getBookTilte
bookTitle string
setBookTitle
Object 1
getBookTitle
bookTitle "The Cyberiad"
Object 2
getBookTitle
bookTitle "The Winner Stands Alone"
setBookTitle
setBookTitle
Object created
Object created
identity integer
identity 1
identity 2
getIdentity
getIdentity
getIdentity
 
Figure 18. Objects created from the class Book. 
Because several objects can be created from one class, objects need a way to identify 
them from each others. From Figure 18 it is easy to see which object is object 1 and which 
is object 2. In practice objects need a simple way to separate them from each others. For 
separation object have identity. In Figure 18 identity is as simple as identity attribute.  
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In object-oriented design, class’s features can be extended or modified with inheritance. 
Inheritance is a method, where class can be part of hierarchical structure of classes, where 
the class inherits the parent class or parent classes. In Figure 18 class Book could have 
connection to ActionBook subclass that would have features of book, but also define more 
specific attributes and methods, which are typical for action book. In this way classes 
separate things to logical modules and class defines particular functions for particular 
things. Inheritance bring possibility to polymorphism. Polymorphism mean that at place 
of an object can be used a sub-object of the object.  
3.4.2 OSI Model 
OSI model is de facto model to present communication protocols architectures. The 
model presents reference model, which has seven layers, for creating communication be-
tween two nodes. 
OSI reference model development started in the 1977 by American National Standard 
Institute (ANSI). The final model was produced by ISO and the International Telecom-
munication Union – Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T). Communica-
tion protocols’ architectural design refer often to OSI model. OSI model is presented in 
Figure 19 below. In the figure OSI model layers are presented on the right side and next 
to OSI model are examples from roles of layers. 
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Figure 19. OSI model architecture and explanation [44, 45]. 
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OSI model is divided into seven layers. Each layer has specific function and a protocol to 
implement this functionality [44]. Together protocols provide communication gateway 
for application process that operate on top of OSI model stack. Layers are numbered from 
1 to 7 from which physical layer is layer number 1. Layers are described next. 
The first layer is physical layer. The layer is in response to define relationship between 
device and a physical route. The layer provides interconnection to the physical route.  
Data link layer is layer number two, and is in response to pack the information and transfer 
it to the next node. The layer detects and repairs physical layer errors.  
Layer number three is network layer. Network layer transfers data sequences from sender 
to receiver over a network. The layer also provides possibility to routing where the net-
work layer acts as a connection point between the original sender and the final destination 
of a message. 
The fourth layer is transport layer that guards the message transfer from sender to the 
destination. The layer takes care of transferring the message. Transport layer optimizes 
the usage of the communication with minimum costs.  
Session layer is layer number five, and it controls sender’s connections to different re-
ceivers. The layer manages connection between presentation layers by establishing and 
closing connections. Session layer also controls the data exchange, limits the amount of 
the data and synchronize messages between the sender and receiver. 
The sixth layer is presentation layer. Presentation layer provides services for application 
layer to form exchanged data to an understandable format. The services, which presenta-
tion layer provides, are controlling structured data, managing data exchange and display-
ing data structures. 
Application layer is the top layer and layer number seven. The layer provides syntax to 
application processes that the message sender and receiver are able to communicate with 
each other. Application layer forms the application process data into a form that is com-
mon for the sender and destination. 
3.4.3 IEC 61850 
IEC 61850 standard is originally made for communication in substations to remove in-
teroperability issues between various vendors appliances in the one system. The standard 
itself describes data model and communication framework. 
IEC 61850 the first edition was published in the 2004. It was introduced as a communi-
cation standard for distribution automation. The second edition was introduced in the 
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2011. The key driver for the second edition was interoperability difficulties between dif-
ferent vendors implementations from the standard [46]. Interoperability issues were col-
lected to www.tissues.iec61850.com website and modified to the second edition. Due to 
modifications, the first and the second edition have technical differences that might cause 
trouble in backward compatibility. Backward compatibility issues may arise in object ref-
erences, flexible naming, schema version 2.0, new logical node and new common data 
classes.  
Figure 20 below presents the ten main parts from the standard IEC 61850. These parts 
were introduced in the first edition of the standard. 
 
Figure 20. IEC 61850 major parts overview [47]. 
IEC 61850 has 10 major parts. 61850-1 presents overview to standard. 61850-2 provides 
terms’ descriptions, which are used in the standard. 61850-3 defines general requirements 
about design, construction and environment of substation automation. 61850-4 describes 
system project management aspects, such as engineering requirements. 61850-5 describes 
communication requirements for functions and device models. 61850-6 covers system 
configuration model. Parts 61850-7, -8 and -9 cover information model and detailed com-
munication methods [48]. In addition to the major parts, IEC 61850 also contains parts 
for mapping the standard on other protocols, and technical reports. Figure 21 below show 
how parts seven, eight and nine are positioned in OSI model. 
Part 1
• Introduction and overview
Part 2
• Glossary
Part 3
• General requirements
Part 4
• System and project management
Part 5
• Communication requirements for functions and devicemodels
Part 6
• Configuration description language for communication 
Part 7
• Basic communication structure
Part 8
• Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM), MMS
Part 9
• SCSM, sample values (SV) and GOOSE
Part 10
• Conformance testing
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Figure 21. IEC 61850 parts positioning in OSI architecture [48]. 
Figure 21 show OSI model and IEC 61850 parts. Parts 7-4 and 7-3 introduce information 
model. Part 7-2 presents information exchange between client and server. Parts 8-1 and 
9-2 implemented how specific IEC 61850 protocols are mapped on OSI model [49]. 9-2 
part presents mapping of sampled values whereas part 8-1 proposes mapping of MMS 
and GOOSE. The difference between MMS and GOOSE is that MMS is mapped on ap-
plication layer whereas GOOSE is mapped on Ethernet frame which is located on data 
link layer in OSI model [50]. In addition to GOOSE message, sample value is also 
mapped straight on data link layer to receive the shortest processing time and the fastest 
speed for sent data. 
IEC 61850 information model is based on object-oriented design and the information 
model encapsulates data and methods into modules [49]. The information model is lo-
cated on top of OSI model application layer as can be seen earlier in Figure 21. Infor-
mation model’s logical structure is presented in Figure 22 below.  
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Figure 22. Information model in IEC 61850-7-X [49]. 
IEC 61850 information model is a stack of objects. On the first layer is physical device, 
like IED [50]. IEDs functionalities (protection, automation and etc.) are divided into log-
ical devices (LDs). The standard does not specify any LDs. LD encapsulate logical nodes 
(LNs) that are standardized service blocks, which are defined in the IEC 61850 part 7-4. 
LN includes data classes that offer interface to access data attributes. Data attributes in-
clude the information that presents the state of LN. IEC 61850 information and infor-
mation exchange models are abstract, which means that there is no specific implementa-
tion for these models. 
An example from IEC 61850 information model is presented in Figure 23 below. The 
figure presents IEC 61850 information model from REF615. The IEC 61850 physical 
device is REF615 in the presented information model. REF615 includes several LDs from 
which CTRL is chosen [50]. CTRL object includes control equipment that are listed in 
LN column. Each LN has several data objects (DOs) which refers to data class earlier in 
Figure 22. DA column includes data attributes that the DO owns. FC column defines 
functional constrains, which defines purpose of data attributes, and services that data at-
tribute provide. In Figure 23 the field Data set entities contains an IEC 61850 object from 
which CTRL.CBXCBR1.Pos.stVal(ST) is colored with blue. The object means line 
switch positions state.  
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Figure 23. IEC 61850 information model of REF615 from PCM tool. 
3.4.4 IEC 60870-5-104 
IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC 104) is part of IEC 60870 standard that presents communication 
standard for remote control and monitoring in the field of power system automation. IEC 
60870-5 part describes transmission protocols for communication between two systems. 
IEC 104 is companion standard, which extends the definitions of the main parts of IEC 
60870 [51]. This chapter describes the standard’s history, information model and com-
munication. 
IEC 104 is developed from IEC 60870-5-101 (IEC 101). IEC 101 was published in the 
1995, and it was developed for telecontrol and serial communication. Due to low band-
width of IEC 101 and increased need for better information flow, IEC 104 was developed 
and published in the year 2000. IEC 104 describes the similar data structure and function-
alities as IEC 101 with minor changes [51]. The most important benefit that IEC 104 
brought to remote control and operation of the power system automation, when compar-
ing to IEC 101, was internet protocol TCP/IP. 
IEC 104 protocol stack implements the most of OSI model layers. The OSI model archi-
tecture of IEC 104 and 101 is presented in Figure 24 below. The application layer of IEC 
104 and 101 maps the application data into Application Service Data Units (ASDUs) that 
contain the information elements components that transfer the fundamental information 
under the protocols. On transport, network, data link and physical layers, IEC 104 pro-
vides TCP/IP, while IEC 101 implements only data link layer and physical layer for serial 
communication. 
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Figure 24. IEC 104 compared to OSI model [51]. 
ASDU is the information model in IEC 104, which contains the process data and identi-
fier. In ASDU the process data is stored into information objects’ information elements. 
Figure 25 below presents two different ASDU structures for IEC 104 and 101. ASDU on 
left side has several information objects, whereas ASDU on right side has several infor-
mation elements. 
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Figure 25. IEC 104 and 101 ASDU types [53]. 
The first module in the ASDU structures is data unit identifier that contains type of the 
data, destination and extra information about the data. In data unit identifier the first ele-
ment is Type ID that can have a type codes between numbers 1-126 to define information 
object’s purpose. The information object’s purpose can be controlling, monitoring or file 
transferring. Variable structure qualifier (SQ) tells, if ASDU includes several information 
objects or information elements. In Figure 25 ASDU on left side includes several infor-
mation objects, whereas ASDU on the right side includes one information object, which 
contains several information elements. Cause of transmission (COT) element routes the 
message in communication network and within the station to an intended task or program. 
COT originator address is needed in systems that has more than one control station. Com-
mon Address of ASDU is often referred as station address, which is an address to identify 
a slave stations and the address is unique for each slave.  
The second module in ASDU structure is information object. One ASDU can hold several 
information objects, which depends on the type of ASDU. In information object the first 
element is information object address (IOA) that identifies particular information in the 
controlled station [51]. The second element in information object is information element 
that holds the data concerning the observed data point, like current measurement value. 
One information object can hold several information elements, which depends on the type 
of ASDU. The last element in the object is time tag, but it is not necessary. 
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To define communication between different vendors devices, IEC 104 provides interop-
erability guide, which offers selection of parameters that vendors can implement in their 
devices. The standard offers a document that vendors can use to present supported func-
tionalities of their devices. Structure of interoperability guide is described in Figure 26 
below. The first section in the interoperability guide contains information about the de-
vice, whereas sections network configuration, physical layer and link layer are not in-
cluded to the IEC 104 protocol. Application layer section presents ASDU elements and 
the last section presents basic application functions [52]. In the interoperability guide, 
parts that are only presented in IEC 101 are strike-through and the check box is marked 
with black colour.   
IEC 104 Interoperability guide 
System or device:
Definition, master, slave
Network configuration:
Not used in IEC 104
Physical layer:
Not used in IEC 104
Link layer:
Not used in IEC 104
Application layer:
ASDU information, standard ASDUs
Basic application functions:
More detailed information about information 
transmission
 
Figure 26. IEC 104 interoperability guide structure [52]. 
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3.4.5 OPC 
OPC is a standard for data exchange between separate automation systems, it is widely 
accepted standard in industries and common in SCADA systems. [53]. The standard is 
developed and maintained by OPC Foundation. OPC is divided to Classic OPC and new 
OPC Unified Architecture (UA). Classic OPC is still widely used in industrial automation 
systems [54]. 
Classic OPC was developed in the 1994. The reason for the development was the need 
for standardized communication specification in automation systems. The Classic OPC 
is based on server-client model and it is designed on Microsoft Windows platform [53]. 
Classic OPC offers data interfaces which are Data Access (DA), Alarms and Events 
(A&E), History Data Access (HAD) and few other specifications for external use. DA 
interface is for reading, writing and monitoring for process data. DA is the most used 
interface form Classic OPC. A&E interface is meant for sending notifications from server 
to client and HAD provides access to history data, whereas DA offers real time data.  
Classic OPC is platform dependent, whereas OPC UA is platform independent. The prob-
lem with interoperability was seen as a problem with Classic OPC. XML-DA was devel-
oped for Classic OPC to solve the interoperability issue. Unfortunately, XML-DA did not 
provide as good performance as DA [53]. 
From OSI model perspective, OPC UA is located on the application and application pro-
cess layers. OPC UA information model describes rules and building blocks for the data, 
and OPC UA is based on object-oriented design [53]. In addition to standardized infor-
mation model parts, vendors can specify their own parts. The standard provides base in-
formation model, which can be extended with vendor specific information [54]. The de-
tailed description of OPC UA information model, for developing OPC UA applications, 
is presented in standard IEC 62541. 
3.4.6 DLMS/COSEM  
DLMS/COSEM is specification for meter communication in electricity, heat, thermal en-
ergy, gas and water industries [55]. The protocol is often described as tree steps where 
the first step is COSEM information model, the second step is accessing COSEM objects 
with DLMS services and the third step is accessing communication medias. 
DLMS/COSEM is published by DLMS User Association that provides the basics from 
the protocols in Green Book and Blue Book. Blue Book defines COSEM information 
model and Green Book specifies accessing and transporting the data. In electricity meter-
ing, DLMS/COSEM is also known as IEC 62056 standard and it is maintained by DLMS 
User Association [55]. 
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COSEM is the information model for metering data and it is based on object-oriented 
design [56]. In COSEM the metering data is stored into objects that are created from 
interface classes that are based on COSEM template class model. COSEM template 
model presents basic elements that interface classes can include. Interface classes imple-
ment behavior of objects by defining attributes and methods for objects, whereas object 
represent the real data.  
COSEM objects are identified from each others with a logical name that is known as 
Object Identification System (OBIS) code. In Figure 27 below, two Register objects, 
which are Total positive active energy and Total positive reactive energy, are created 
from the interface class Register. Objects’ logical names are OBIS codes and objects’ 
value is information about the instance. The figure presents how are meter values, reactive 
energy and active energy, saved to Register objects 1 and 2. To use COSEM object, the 
user do not need to know the implementation of the class from which the object is created. 
The user has access to the methods which are interface to access objects attributes.  
 
Figure 27. COSEM classes and objects [57]. 
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OBIS code is 6-byte identifier, which describes the data that the object is holding in. OBIS 
code bytes come from value groups that are designated with letters from A to F [58]. 
Value group A identifies energy type, B identifies the measuring channels, C identifies 
the physical quantities, D identifies country specific identifiers and applications, E is for 
further classification and F identifies historical values. OBIS codes have pre-defined 
meaning and these meanings can be found from DLMS User Association website [59]. 
Figure 28 below illustrates how OBIS codes are formed. In the figure, value groups are 
located on the top, the possible numerical identifiers are located on the middle and OBIS 
code is on the bottom. 
A C D EB F
0-15
Medium
0-64
Channel
0-255
Quantity
0-255
Processing eg. 
integration
0-255
Classifica
tion 0-126
Historical 
values
Possible 
values and 
description
Example and 
description of 
a number
1
Electricity
1
Channel
1
Active power
1
Time init
2
Rate 2
255
Not used
OBIS value group
 
Figure 28. OBIS code [57]. 
COSEM objects’ elements are accessed with DLMS protocol. DLMS is application layer 
protocol, which provides services to access COSEM objects and secure connection be-
tween server and client. In addition to application layer, use of other OSI model layers 
depends on implementation of communication profile. One communication profile option 
is 3-layer stack that uses application, data link and physical layer. In the 3-layer profile, 
DLMS is located on application layer, HDLC on data link layer and physical medias on 
physical layer [60]. In 3-layer connection profile, metering devices are identified with 
HDLC physical address. 
Data exchange is based on client-server-model in DLMS/COSEM. Client and server are 
separate devices, which communicate to each other [60]. Client is responsible of collect-
ing data, whereas server is metering device, which provides the data. Client and server 
are able to communicate to each others with pull or push operations. In pull operations 
client application does requests to server to which server responses, whereas in push op-
eration server application sends pre-defined information to client. 
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4. LABORATORY IMPLEMENTATIONS 
Laboratory implementations present three areas from the course Distribution Automation. 
These areas are substation automation, information systems and customer automation. In 
laboratories, students get touched with real distribution network devices. Each laboratory 
can take approximately two hours. 
Substation automation laboratory offers understanding from IED functionalities and dis-
tribution protection functions. Laboratory tasks and protection fundamentals are same as 
in previous implementation. Upgraded features are protection technology, protection 
functions, IED functionalities, IEC 61850 and new outlook.  
Low voltage network laboratory combines control center of the distribution network and 
the low voltage network. DMS and SCADA are used for visualizing network and control 
operations. Smart meter provides measurements from the low voltage network. 
This chapter describes the laboratory environments. The First part describes substation 
automation laboratory and the second part presents low voltage automation laboratory. 
4.1 Substation automation laboratory implementation 
New implementation from substation automation laboratory changes technical side of la-
boratory. In the new implementation, IEDs are more tightly bounded with simulation 
model.  
The laboratory environment is presented in Figure 29 below. The figure is divided into 
three sections that are simulations, amplifiers and substation automation. Simulation sec-
tion presents simulation environment. Simulations are done by RTDS hardware and con-
trolled with PC. PC is also used for IED configuration and reading disturbance recordings 
from IEDs. Simulations current and voltage measurements are amplified for IEDs to pre-
sent instrument transformer values. Substation IEDs simulate busbar and feeder protec-
tive devices. Communication between IEDs is made with IEC 61850 and both protective 
devices have capability to operate circuit breakers. Circuit breakers are possible to operate 
with tripping function or from IEDs’ LCD screen with push buttons. 
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Figure 29. IED laboratory environment [61-63]. 
4.1.1 IEDs 
Laboratory implementation consists of two REF615 feeder protection IEDs. One IED is 
located at an incoming feeder and the other one at an outgoing feeder. Structure of the 
protection was chosen according to network topology at the previous laboratory imple-
mentation. Protective functionalities fulfil SFS 6001 requirements and are simple to con-
figure. Idea of the laboratory is to see IED in function and learn principles of distribution 
network protection. Protection devices are presented in Figure 30 below. 
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Figure 30. REF615 protection devices in the laboratory. 
REF615 functionalities are depended on order code. The presented IEDs are F variants 
and have directional overcurrent, earth fault, voltage and circuit breaker condition moni-
toring protection applications. IEDs have analog inputs and outputs for phase currents, 
residual current, phase voltages and residual voltage. Devices have 16 binary inputs and 
10 binary outputs. 100Base Ethernet is supported in communication. Communication pro-
tocol is IEC 61850. Operation voltage can be between 48-250V direct current or 100-
240V alternating current. 
REF615 provide wide range of functionalities and used functionalities were chosen ac-
cording to laboratory needs. In the laboratory there are needed directional overcurrent, 
earth-fault protection and circuit breaker protection functions. Blocking signal is send 
with GOOSE messages and faults are recorded with disturbance recorder. Operations, 
measurements and faults are indicated with LEDs and from LCD screen. Circuit breakers 
control are made with binary outputs and indication with binary input terminals. Current 
and voltage measurements are measured from phase values and wye connected at IEDs. 
Residual voltage and current are calculated from fundamental frequency phasors, because 
of using calculated values reduces need for hardwire connections. Also, in the laboratory 
environment, it is possible to use calculated values instead of measured values, because 
simulations use ideal network. When residual current and voltage are calculated at 
REF615, voltage measurement must be wye connected at IEDs’ terminals.  
Overcurrent protection is made with directional overcurrent function. Directional proper-
ties of protection are not in use, because of one input feeder at the substation. Overcurrent 
protection has two stages for low and high overcurrent. Low set stage is for over load 
conditions and small fault currents. High set stage is for high fault currents, such as short 
circuits at beginning of the feeder. Protection functions’ start signals are forwarded to 
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disturbance recorder and operation signals are forwarded to disturbance recorder, tripping 
logic, indication LED and circuit breaker. The busbar protective device’s overcurrent 
high set stage operation is possible to block with GOOSE message that is sent from the 
feeder protective device. At the feeder protective and the busbar protective IEDs the pro-
tection current and operation delay settings are same as in previous laboratory environ-
ment implementation. Previous settings provide required sensitivity and selectivity for 
laboratory protection purposes. Protection settings are modified to correspond new in-
strument transformer ratios. Voltage transformer ratio is 0,1/20kV and current transform-
ers ratio is 1/280A. 
Earth fault protection is implemented with directional earth fault protection function and 
voltage protection function. Directional earth fault protection is used at the feeder, with-
out directional protection functionality and with residual current setting. Voltage protec-
tion function is applied at busbar protective IED, and voltage protection is based on re-
sidual voltage. Earth fault protection functions send start signal to disturbance recorder 
and operation signals are send to disturbance recorder, trip logic, circuit breaker failure 
protection and indication LED. 
GOOSE message provides selectivity, when time delays is not possible option. In the 
laboratory environment, the feeder protection IED sends blocking message, if its high set 
stage protection starts. Block message is sent to busbar protective device that has GOOSE 
receive function. At the busbar IED, GOOSE receive block has output for validation, 
which checks that GOOSE communication is valid. If communication is not in operation, 
LED informs the user about the fault. GOOSE message includes a protection function 
value and a quality value, which is general rule [50].Values IEC 61850 names are 
LD0.DPHLPTOC.Str.general(ST) and LD0.DPHLPTOC.Str.q(ST).   
Disturbance recorder documents protection operation. Both protective devices have dis-
turbance recorder which have signal inputs from all protection functions. In addition to 
protection function, circuit breaker close and open signals, phase currents, phase voltages, 
calculated residual voltage and calculated residual current are recorded. Recording is 
started, only if any protection function sends operation signal. At this way amount of 
recordings are reduced. Reduced amount of recordings aid in searching for recording 
when students make fault simulations.  
In laboratory’s IEDs recording length is set to minimum. Disturbance recordings are edge 
based recording with fixed length. Recording length is 120 cycles from which pre-trig-
gering time is 30%. Storage rate is 32 samples per cycle. One cycle is 20ms in 50Hz 
system. Recording with 120 cycles, recording length is 2,4s. A practical recommendation 
for recording time for REF 630 IED is 2s + fault duration + 3s [17]. In chosen recording 
length pre-triggering time is 800ms, which is enough to record the whole operation time 
of protection function with longest time delay. At busbar IED, earth fault time delay 
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length is 600ms plus operation delay 30ms. With presented recording length is possible 
to record the whole system operation. 
Local human machine interface (LHMI) presents protection operation and switching state 
of feeders. Protection functions operations are presented at LCD screen and with LED 
indicators. LEDs are latched on when protection function operates. Switching devices are 
presented as SLD diagram on screen and circuit breaker is possible to operate with LHMI 
buttons. Instrument transformer measurements are possible to see from LCD screen. 
4.1.2 Simulation environment and connections 
Simulations are executed on RTDS. The simulation model is similar as in previous im-
plementation of the laboratory. Added functionalities into simulation model are circuit 
breaker indication and control, and measurements. 
Breaker control and indication signals to and from RTDS are controlled with GTFPI card. 
GTFPI card has two physical input-ouput-panels in which circuit breaker control and in-
dication signals wires are connected to. Panels are Digital I/O panel and High voltage 
panel. Digital I/O panel’s operation voltage is 5V, whereas High Voltage panel operates 
with 48 V voltage source. Figure 31 below presents GTFPI card. 
 
Figure 31. RTDS inputs and outputs. 
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Indication signals from breaker are located on left side and control signals from IED are 
on right side of Figure 31. Circuit breakers’ open and close indication signals are con-
nected to bit to world component where close indications are connected through inverse 
logical port. With presented implementation, one signal can present both close and open 
indication signals. Indication signals are connected to GTFPI High Voltage panel, be-
cause REF615 binary inputs’ operation voltage is between 24-100V. Control signals are 
received from GTFPI digital panel.  
Circuit breakers control signals are forwarded to circuit breakers control logics from 
GTFPI block. Circuit breaker control logic is presented in Figure 32 below. In breaker 
control logic, a pulse generator is activated from control signal. When the pulse generator 
is activated its output is set to one for 10ms. 10ms is enough for S-R Flip Flop to react 
change in its input. Flip Flop execution time is 0,55ms. S-R Flip flop output changes, if 
its inputs changes and output will not change, if same input is activated as previous time. 
Circuit breaker logic remembers its last stage and sequential activation with help of S-R 
Flip Flop. Flip Flop’s output is connected to delay block that simulates circuit breaker 
operation delay, which is set to 20ms. Delay block is connected to signal that is connected 
to status information and circuit breaker model. Status information and circuit breaker 
models signals are located under circuit breaker control logic in Figure 32. Multiplication 
blocks are needed because of the simulation software, because signals are always con-
nected to other signals trough other simulation functions in RTDS Draft program. 
 
Figure 32. Breaker control signal detector. 
Current and voltage measurements are connected to amplifiers from RTDS through 
GTAO analog output card. Output signals are millivolts which are needed to amplify to 
get real values of measurement circuit for IEDs. Current measurements are scaled with 
value 7 and voltages are scaled with value 50 when taking into consideration the amplifier 
amplifications that are 50 for voltage and 5 for current. Nominal phase voltage of simu-
lation model is 11,547kV, which is 57,735V in secondary side. Primary current’s nominal 
value is 280A, which is 1A on secondary side. Voltage and current output signals are 
limited to prevent hazardous currents and voltages that could damage the amplifier. This 
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may cause difference between simulation model and disturbance recording measure-
ments.   
For measurement purposes, RTDS provides IEC 61850 sample values. Sample values 
would reduce the amount of hardwires and the amplifier would not be needed. Sample 
values are not used in this laboratory environment, because REF615 does not fully sup-
port measurement with sample values. Only voltage measurement is supported. In addi-
tion, laboratory’s router do not include support for IEC 61850 sample value. 
4.2 Low voltage automation laboratory 
The laboratory environment of low voltage automation is constructed from two systems. 
One system covers AMI system and other system covers substation automation. 
AMI system structure is presented in Figure 33 below. Low voltage network is simulated 
with RTDS simulator. Currents and voltages are amplified for smart meter at OMICRON 
amplifier. Smart meter and gateway communicate with DLMS/COSEM. Gateway pulls 
metering data from smart meter every three seconds. Gateway and SCADA communica-
tion is implemented with IEC 104 and SCADA pulls metering data from gateway. 
SCADA operates as AMI MDMS, which provides data to DMS through OPC interface 
software. 
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Figure 33. AMI system structure [41, 61, 62, 64]. 
Substation automation system is presented in Figure 34 below. RTDS simulates substa-
tion devices and substation RTU has two-way communication to RTDS. RTU forwards 
status, measurement and command information. Communication between RTDS and 
RTU is implemented with IEC 104. RTU and SCADA also have bi-directional commu-
nication with IEC 104. SCADA collects substation data and presents it in UI on single-
line-diagram (SLD). DMS get substation state information from SCADA, and DMS uses 
the data from SCADA to presents the distribution network topology and state on a map. 
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Figure 34. Substation automation system [62-64]. 
Following subsections describe more precisely the laboratory environment. The subsec-
tions present the laboratory environment from device level. 
4.2.1 Simulation environment 
New laboratory environment’s simulation model is similar to the previous laboratory en-
vironment’s model. The new model is appended with three feeders, IEC 104 signal block, 
circuit breaker control logics and medium voltage measurements. 
RTDS supports IEC 104 protocol that is added to the simulation model with GTNET-
IEC104 block, which is presented in Figure 35 below. GTNET requires parameters to 
establish connection. Required parameters are a common address of ASDU, IP address 
of a master station, port number for TCP connection and a point file where IEC 104 pro-
cess points are configured for RTDS.  
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Figure 35. IEC 104 communication block. 
GTNET-IEC104 does not support the whole standard. Interoperability guide defines sup-
ported features for GTNET [65]. Table 3 presents supported process information ASDUs. 
Table 3. Supported ASDUs for process information [65]. 
 
In simulation model IEC 104 standard is used for medium voltage bay level process 
points. Process points include circuit breaker status and commands, busbar voltages, feed-
ers’ currents, residual currents and voltage. Fuse blow alarm simulation use IEC 104 from 
the low voltage network. 
Simulation environment contains five breaker control logics from which one is presented 
in Figure 36 below. The idea of the control logic is to receive commands from SCADA, 
process the operation command, send processed command to circuit breaker and provide 
breaker status information.  
 
Figure 36. A breaker control logic from simulation model. 
Monitor direction Control direction
Single-point information Single command
Measured value, short floating point value Set point command, short floating point value
Single-point information with time tag CP56Time2a
Supported process information ASDUs
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Figure 36 breaker module is built with RTDS component library’s blocks. Word-to-bit 
block converts command signal to logical form. In world-to-bit block, open command is 
least significant bit (LSB) and close command is most significant bit (MSB). Next com-
ponent is timer block from word-to-bit converter. Timer sets its output to one for 10ms 
when it triggers. The figure’s OR gate has inputs from open command and relay trip com-
mand. Protection relays are not used in the laboratory exercise. Next from OR gate is S-
R Flip Flop which stores the previous state information. Operation of S-R Flip Flop was 
explained in part 4.1.2. Flip flop’s outputs affect to the begin state of the breaker. In pre-
sented modification, Q inverse is set to zero in the beginning of simulation. By setting Q 
inverse to zero, the breaker is open when simulation is started. Flip flop is followed by 
timer block which simulates breaker operation delay. Breaker operation delay is 30ms in 
simulation. Breaker control signal is send with BRKCTRL5 block and status information 
is transferred with bit-to-world block where LSB is open indication and MSB is close 
indication. 
4.2.2 Smart meter 
The laboratory environment uses LandisGyr E650 smart meter. The meter receives meas-
urements from RTDS through the amplifier. LandisGyr meter sends measured values to 
gateway that works as data concentrator. 
The smart meter is LandisGyr ZMD405CT44.0457 S3 B32. The meter is suitable for 
different voltage levels, but the meter is generally used by large consumers. The meter is 
designed to use instrument transformers in current measurement and sometimes in volt-
age measurement. In communication, the meter can use several protocols of data link 
layer, such as Ethernet and HDLC. 
Circuit diagram from current and voltage measurements is presented in Figure 37 below. 
Voltage and current inputs are from OMICRON amplifier. Voltage transformer’s ration 
is 100/400V and current transformer’s ratio is 5/100A. 
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Figure 37. Measuring circuit diagram. 
Currents and voltage measurements are from GTAO card of RTDS. GTAO card outputs 
are scaled with factors 0,5 for current and 0,99593 for voltage in the simulation model. 
OMICRON amplifier transfers the values to real instrument transformer values for the 
meter.  
The smart meter supports DLMS/COSEM in communication. Meter supports specifica-
tions that are determined by official standards. These specifications are DLMS physical 
layer, DLMS link layer with HDLC definition and DLMS/COSEM application layer.  
The meter is accessed by HDLC address. In LandisGyr meters physical HDLC address is 
last four digits of the meter’s device number plus 1000. HDLC address can get values 
between 1000 and 10999.  
Accessing DLMS/COSEM objects, the DLMS master needs OBIS codes of COSEM ob-
ject. LandisGyr meters use shorten format from OBIS codes and supported codes are 
listed in device’s User Manual [66]. In addition to User Manual, standard OBIS codes are 
listed in DLMS User Association’s website [67]. 
4.2.3 Data concentrator and RTU 
In the laboratory, data concentrator and RTU units are integrated into one device. In the 
normal distribution network, smart meter data is not send through substation RTU. In the 
laboratory environment, one unit is enough to transfer all the data that is sent from smart 
meter, RTDS and SCADA.  
The laboratory environment uses iGW communication gateway, which is manufactured 
by iGrid T&D. Gateway functions are similar as RTU’s functions, but gateway does not 
provide I/O capability. In communication iGW uses Ethernet on data link layer, and it 
supports several SCADA protocols and DLMS/COSEM. In the laboratory environment, 
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iGW uses IEC 104 and DLMS/COSEM in communication where IEC 104 is used in 
communication to RTDS and SCADA, whereas DLMS/COSEM is for communication 
with the smart meter. 
Communication from iGW to RTDS is done with IEC 104, in which iGW operates as 
IEC 104 client and RTDS as server. RTDS model provides substation measurements and 
circuit breaker status signals, and RTDS receives SCADA’s open and close commands 
are from iGW. For signals iGW provides five signal groups, from which three are used: 
digital input, digital output, and analog input. Digital input signals are single-point infor-
mation ASDUs, which are used for status indication, digital output signals are command 
signals, which are single-command ASDUs with select-before-operate command, and an-
alog inputs are short floating point values, which are used for measurements. All signals 
need information object addresses (IOA) which are from configuration text file of RTDS 
IEC 104 process points. iGW’s IEC 104 related settings are from IEC 104 interoperability 
guide and iGW configuration default values. 
Communication between iGW and smart meter is done with DLMS/COSEM where iGW 
operates as client device with three second pulling frequency. From smart meter OBIS 
codes, iGW supports only measured and energy codes. Measurements are 32 bit and 64 
bit signed values where energy measurement is only 64 bit scaled value and it is read as 
counter input at iGW. Other smart meter values are analog inputs. 
SCADA and iGW connection is established with IEC 104 where iGW operates as slave 
device. Protocol was chosen for this purpose, because IEC 104 is common protocol be-
tween SCADA and RTU. RTDS IEC 104 values and the meters values are mapped at 
RTU on IEC 104 to SCADA. Smart meter ASDUs are short floating point values and 
integrated totals without time tags. Substation ASDUs are same as between at iGW IEC 
104 master and substation. IOA values are 8000-> for digital inputs, 8050-> for com-
mands, 7000-> for analog inputs and 2008 for counter inputs. 
4.2.4 SCADA 
ABB MicroSCADA Pro SYS600 is used as SCADA in the laboratory environment. The 
role of the system is to present SLD on UI, operate breakers, get process data from gate-
way, forward process data to DMS and manage communication.  
SCADA presents system picture in SLD diagram on UI. Substation picture is presented 
in Figure 38 below. The SLD diagram presents all the fundamental substation compo-
nents, which are line disconnectors Q1 and Q2, circuit breaker Q0, earth switch Q9, and 
current and voltage transformers. Component symbols are chosen according to how well 
they present the functionality. Chosen components present well the open disconnectors, 
because those resemble switches. Components status change depending on substation 
simulation, commands are possible to send by clicking a symbol and measurements are 
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updated next to instrument transformer symbols. In the beginning of the feeders is showed 
text “Remote”, if feeder is controlled remotely. Substation feeders color changes accord-
ing to current topology. Topology is imported from DMS through OPC interface program. 
 
Figure 38. SCADA SLD. 
System process data is saved to process objects that are part of Application object. Process 
objects are created with standard function tool, which can be used to create standard pro-
cess objects. Substation process objects are circuit breaker status and commands, voltage 
transformer measurements and current transformer measurement. Indications are created 
as single indication ASDU, measurements are floating point ASDUs and commands as 
single command ASDUs. AMI system information is collected to manually created pro-
cess objects, which are floating point ASDUs and integrated total ASDU. In AMI process 
object indexing, DMS intermediary file of metering data impacts to index numbers.  
From process objects, circuit breakers are only components that are possible to control. 
Circuit breaker symbols get open and close information as separate signals as well as 
circuit breaker commands are send as separate signals. Commands are direct commands 
with binary output signal and indication signals are binary inputs. ASDU types are single 
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commands without time tags and single indications without time tags although ABB’s 
manual recommends to use time tagged values, whereas IEC 104 standard recommends 
to use time tag in the systems where time delay could be a problem. In the laboratory 
environment, topology of the communication network is small. For this reason time delay 
is not considered as a problem. The second reason, for not using time tagged values, is 
clock synchronization. Clock synchronization could cause problems, if devices’ clocks 
are not synchronized. In IEC 104 time tagged commands will not be proceeded, if com-
mand receiver notices that command has arrived after allowed delay [52]. 
Communication between SCADA and DMS is done through OPC interface program 
where AMI system, switching indication and topology management has own OPC clas-
ses. Substation components’ OPC objects are generated automatically with SCADA’s 
import function, but AMI and topology objects are needed to create manually.  
4.2.5 DMS 
In the laboratory environment, DMS presents the distribution network topology on a 
background map. DMS gets network and process information from database and 
SCADA. SCADA communication is done through OPC interface program which was 
presented earlier. 
In the laboratory environment, DMS uses the background map, which is on default in the 
software. The map picture is from the city of Virrat, Finland. Substation is located on area 
where was not earlier network infrastructure. The new network structure includes same 
parts as the simulation model. Low voltage customer point presents measured quantities 
of the smart meter and measured quantities are presented as they are configured to the 
intermediary file. Network components and lines of simulation model are chosen from 
default DMS components, which means that electrical values of network components do 
not correspond to simulation model values. This has no effect in the laboratory environ-
ment, but network components’ parameters should be changed to correspond the correct 
values, if network calculation are wanted to take as part of the assignment for example. 
In DMS, AMI intermediary configuration file provides information from AMI process 
data for DMS. The file lists process points in measurements and events that include in-
formation about description and index of process points. All the smart meters measure-
ments and RTDS’s fuse blow event are configured into the interoperability file. 
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5. TESTING LABORATORY ENVIRONMENTS 
This chapter presents laboratory test phase and investigates the results. Laboratory envi-
ronments are tested to verify correct operation in exercises. Substation automation labor-
atory is tested in fault situations, whereas the operation of smart meter laboratory is veri-
fied in normal conditions and in neutral conductor fault.  
5.1 Fault simulations in distribution network 
The substation automation laboratory exercise includes detecting of protection sensitiv-
ity, selectivity and back-up protection. The normal operation, short circuit faults, earth 
faults and blocking message are analyzed to approve functionality of the laboratory. Cir-
cuit breakers should be possible to operate in normal conditions with IEDs. IEDs’ pro-
tection functions are not allowed to operate in normal conditions. Current protection set-
tings are designed to detect the rated currents. The rated currents are maximum load cur-
rent, two-phase fault in end of feeder, three-phase fault in beginning of the feeder and 
three-phase fault at busbar. Earth fault sensitivity requirement is set to 1000Ω fault re-
sistance. When feeder length is increased to 200km, protection should not detect faults at 
the end of the feeder, because the sensitivity is set to detect faults at 50km feeder. Protec-
tion devices should operate only to faults that are at the protection area of device. The 
selectivity is provided with time selectivity and block message. 
Table 4 below presents normal load current and voltage values in the network. Current 
values are measured at the busbar and the feeder. Voltage measurements are from busbar. 
RTDS values are steady state measurements that are read from RTDS meter block. IED 
values are from IEDs UI. The simulations present the operation of circuit breakers to 
make sure how circuit breakers and IED operate in normal load conditions. In the first 
three simulations, the feeder breaker is operated, in simulations four and five, the busbar 
breaker is operated, and in the last simulation, the network length is changed.  
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Table 4. IEDs operation in normal conditions. 
Simulation cases RTDS IED 
  Busbar Feeder Busbar Feeder 
Description 
Current 
(A) 
Voltage 
(kV) 
U0 
(kV) 
Current 
(A) 
I0 
(A) 
Cur-
rent 
(A) 
Voltage 
(kV) 
Cur-
rent 
(A) 
Voltage 
(kV) 
Normal load condition, 
breaker close operation 162,1 11,9 0 40,5 0 161,7 11,9 40,4 11,9 
Normal load condition, 
feeder breaker open 121,9 12,0 0 0,0 0 121,7 11,9 0 12,0 
Normal load condition, 
feeder breaker fault, open 
operation 162,1 11,9 0 40,5 0 161,8 11,9 40,4 11,9 
Normal load condition, bus-
bar breaker, open operation 0 0,1 0 0,0 0 0 0,0 0 0,0 
Normal load condition, bus-
bar breaker fault, open op-
eration 162,1 11,9 0 40,5 0 161,9 11,9 40,4 11,9 
Normal load condition, 
feeder length 50km->200km 153 11,9 0 31,3 0 152,7 11,9 31,3 11,9 
 
IEDs’ measured current and voltage values are close to RTDS measured values in normal 
conditions. Residual current and voltage are zero in normal operation state. Circuit break-
ers were possible to operate open and close from IEDs. When feeder breaker was open 
and busbar breaker was closed, feeder IED’s current measurements were zero and voltage 
measurement presented the voltage value at busbar, and busbar protection IED presented 
current and voltage values. When busbar breaker was open and feeder breaker was closed, 
both protection devices’ measurements presented zero. In some cases was noticed, that in 
the beginning of simulations, low set stage of overcurrent protection started at both pro-
tection devices. Inrush detector could prevent exceeding effective start value in the be-
ginning of simulations [23].   
Table 5 below presents short circuit fault currents and protection operation time at busbar 
and feeder circuit breakers. RTDS column values are calculated from fault current steady 
state peak values by dividing the peak value with square of two. IEDs column values are 
from disturbance recordings. Simulation cases present two- and three-phase faults at the 
outgoing feeder. Fault locations are 10km and 50km from primary substation. Two-phase 
faults are simulated between phases A and B. Simulation cases cover all rated faults and 
increase of feeder length. Busbar protection IED disturbance recording configuration is 
modified to start recording when protection starts for these simulations. 
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Table 5. Short circuit faults. 
Simulation cases Calculated RTDS IEDs 
  
Bus-
bar Feeder 
Bus-
bar Feeder Busbar Feeder 
Description 
Cur-
rent 
Cur-
rent 
Cur-
rent 
Cur-
rent 
Cur-
rent 
Opera-
tion 
Cur-
rent 
Opera-
tion 
Two-phase short circuit AB 
50km, time selective 494,7 370,4 493,0 367,0 475,7 Start 355,9 0,452 
Three-phase short circuit 50km, 
time selective 552,0 427,7 523,3 422,1 546,7 Start 442,5 0,438 
Two-phase short circuit AB 
10km, time selective 1530,7 1406,5 1499,8 1411,4 1650,0 Start 1533,0 0,103 
Three-phase short circuit 10km, 
time selective 1748,3 1624,0 1668,6 1623,9 1571,0 Start 1687,0 0,102 
Two-phase short circuit at bus-
bar AB, time selective 3781,8 X 4674,5 23,4 2516,5 0,236 X No 
Three-phase short circuit at 
busbar, time selective 4366,8 X 5976,3 0,0 4270,0 0,239 X No 
Two-phase short circuit 50km-
>200km 191,7 97,8 226,1 108,0 223,8 No 104,1 0,44 
 
In Table 5 calculated fault currents are close to RTDS values and IEDs values in cases 
where fault current is small. When fault currents increase, the difference between current 
values increase. Time selectivity functioned correctly. With small fault currents the time 
delay was longer than in cases were fault current was high. Busbar protection IED did not 
operate before feeder IED in feeder faults as well as sensitivity was set to correct level, 
because feeder protection noticed all rated faults. Busbar protection device also noticed 
the faults expect in 200km case which was expected. Extending the feeder length to 
200km caused decrease in the fault current, and busbar protective device could not detect 
the fault anymore. Low set stage current protection of the feeder protection device oper-
ated to faults with 50km and 200km distance. High set stage of the feeder device operated 
to 10km faults. LHMI presented protection functions triggering with LEDs. If feeder 
length is wanted to extend to 200km, the busbar protection overcurrent protection low set 
stage would need to be re-calculated to fulfil requirements for overcurrent back-up pro-
tection.  
Table 6 below presents measurements from earth faults. The first column includes values 
that are calculated with formulas 4 and 5 from subsection 3.1.4. The RTDS column values 
are from RSCAD Runtime environment and IEDs column are the busbar and the feeder 
breaker operations. Simulation cases present faults with different fault resistances. Fault 
resistances are 500Ω, 1000Ω and 3000Ω. The protection is designed to detect faults with 
minimum of 1000Ω fault resistance.  
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Table 6. Earth faults. 
Simulation cases Calculated RTDS IED 
  
Bus-
bar Feeder 
Bus-
bar Feeder Busbar Feeder 
Description 
U0 
(kV) 
I0 
(A) 
U0 
(kV) 
I0 
(A) 
Oper-
ated 
Time 
(s) 
Oper-
ated 
Time 
(s) 
Line-to-ground fault feeder 
50km, Phase A ,Rf=500 Ω 10,4 7,5 10,0 7,1 Start No Yes 0,454 
Line-to-ground fault at feeder 
50km,  Rf=1000 Ω 8,3 6,0 7,9 5,8 Start No Yes 0,470 
Line-to-ground fault at feeder 
50km,  Rf=3000 Ω 3,8 2,7 3,5 2,6 No No No No 
Line-to-ground fault at feeder 
10km,  Rf=500 Ω 10,4 9,5 10,6 8,3 Start No Yes 0,429 
Line-to-ground fault at feeder 
10km, Rf=1000 Ω 8,3 6,0 8,4 6,2 Start No Yes 0,472 
Feeder length 50->200km, Line-
to-ground fault, Rf=500 Ω 8,8 6,4 7,2 5,2 Start No Yes 0,457 
Feeder length 50->200km, Line-
to-ground fault, Rf=1000 Ω 5,9 4,3 4,1 3,3 No No No No 
 
In simulated earth faults, protection devices operated as expected. Both devices noticed 
faults with fault resistance 1000Ω and 500Ω with feeder lengths 10km to 50km. When 
feeder length increased to 200km, devices could not recognize rated 1000Ω fault re-
sistance anymore. To detect faults with 1000Ω in 200km faults, this would need modifi-
cation to sensitivity. In busbar faults voltage protection function operated at the busbar 
protection device. In all faults earth fault indication LED lighted up to inform about op-
eration. Operation functions also lighted up the disturbance recording LED. The 3000Ω 
high fault resistance was not possible to detect with presented protection settings. Today, 
modern protection functions are able to detect fault resistances up to 10kΩ [12, 14], which 
is much better sensitivity than the laboratory was able to achieve.  
Table 7 below presents operation of GOOSE block message in the laboratory environ-
ment. The busbar and feeder protective devices’ operation delays are listed in the table. 
The table lists scenarios without blocking message, with blocking message and in com-
munication failure. In the simulations high set protection operation delay is set to 100ms. 
The first simulation is done without GOOSE message to detect operation without block-
ing when time delays are non-selective. Two simulations present GOOSE message oper-
ation when time delay is set to smaller than 100ms at busbar protection IED. Time delays 
were set to shorter to detect operation of GOOSE message. Back up protection function-
ality is verified with feeder circuit breaker fault. GOOSE message should not block back-
up operation. A disturbance recording from simulation should present the whole operation 
of busbar protection device. In the last simulation case, communication between devices 
is disconnected. When communication is non-functional, busbar protection device should 
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detect bad quality of GOOSE message, because this informs the user about communica-
tion malfunction.  
Table 7. GOOSE message operation. 
Simulation cases IEDs 
  Busbar Feeder 
Description 
Oper-
ate Time 
Oper-
ate Time 
Three-phase short circuit 10km, 
without GOOSE Yes x Yes X 
Two-phase short circuit 10km, 
GOOSE block message No No Yes 0,096 
Three-phase short circuit 10km, 
GOOSE block message No No Yes 0,099 
Three-phase short circuit 10km, 
GOOSE block message No No Yes 0,096 
Two-phase short circuit 10km, 
GOOSE block message, feeder 
breaker fault Yes 0,650 No No 
Two-phase short circuit at busbar, 
GOOSE block message Yes 0,134 No No 
Two-phase short circuit busbar, 
communication disconnected Yes 0,134 No No 
 
Both devices operated without and with GOOSE message as expected. When time selec-
tivity was set as non-selective, both devices operated in the feeder fault. Because the op-
eration delay is reduced at busbar protection device, the block message is needed to re-
ceive selective operation. After enabling GOOSE message, the busbar protection device 
received block message from the feeder device. GOOSE message blocked the high set 
current protection function of the busbar IED. Blocking functionality worked also with 
shorter time delay than 100ms. In circuit breaker fault at the feeder, the busbar device 
operated as back up protection. Because block command blocks the high set stage opera-
tion of busbar IED, the low set stage of the busbar IED has still possibility to operate and 
remove the faulted feeder from the network. In communication malfunction the busbar 
IED noticed the bad quality of GOOSE message when communication cable was discon-
nected from busbar device. The busbar device indicated communication malfunction with 
LED.  
Figure 39 below presents a disturbance recording from the busbar device. The simulated 
case is situation where the feeder circuit breaker has fault and there is two-phase short 
circuit in the network. The recording is based on pre-triggering setting. In recording pre-
triggering time is 0-0,770 and post-triggering 0,770-2,4s. And more detailed, pre-fault 
time is 0-0,128s, fault length is 0,128-0,770s and post fault is 0,770-2,4s. The recording 
presents the whole event, but pre-fault time could be longer.  
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Figure 39. Disturbance recording in feeder circuit breaker fault from busbar IED. 
5.2 Low voltage network simulations 
This section presents smart meter measurements in DMS. RTDS simulation values are 
compared to DMS values and to calculated values from the low voltage network. Calcu-
lated values are from a neutral fault calculation Matlab tool that was presented in subsec-
tion 2.2.2. The comparison is done to verify measurements accuracy of the smart meter 
and that values are presented correctly in DMS. The Matlab tool is used for two reasons, 
the one reason is that students calculate fault voltages with the tool and the other reason 
is to detect that RTDS values are similar. Tool can calculate normal operation and neutral 
conductor faults in the low voltage network.  
Table 8 below presents voltage magnitudes and angles in AMI system, which are calcu-
lated with the Matlab tool. The first column presents loading situations, in which the first 
load scenario includes three 2,5kW loads, the second load scenario has one 2,5kW load 
and two 1kW loads, and the third scenario has one 2,5kW load, one 1kW load and one 
0,00005kW load. Scenarios have different size of loads at phases, because different loads 
cause unbalance in low voltage network. Voltage magnitudes and angles are collected to 
columns from different lengths of the low voltage network. The columns numerical val-
ues are distances between SS and customer. Distances are 100m, 500m and 1km from SS 
to customer.  
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Table 8. Normal condition voltages calculated with the Matlab tool. 
Calculated values 
Length of AMKA 100m Angle 500m Angle 1km Anlge 
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 230,0 0 226,3 0 221,8 0 
Phase L2 load 2,5kW 230,0 -120,0 226,3 -120,0 221,8 -120,0 
Phase L3 load 2,5kW 230,0 120,0 226,3 120,0 221,8 120,0 
UN 0 0 0 0 0 0 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 229,5 0 224,1 0 217,9 0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 230,8 -119,7 230,4 -119,9 229,6 -120,2 
Phase L3 load 1 kW 230,7 120,5 229,9 121,0 228,8 121,5 
UN 0,5 7,5 2,2 7,1 4,1 6,6 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5 kW 229,3 0 223,4 0 216,2 0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 230,7 -119,9 229,8 -120,6 228,6 -121,5 
Phase L3 load 1E-5 kW 231,4 120,7 233,2 121,0 235,5 121,4 
UN 1,4 -23,0 3,3 -16,2 11,3 -23,4 
 
Table 9 below presents smart meter measured values in normal load conditions from 
DMS. Values are collected from DMS customer point and table is similar as Table 8 
earlier above except from neutral voltage values. Neutral voltage values are not listed in 
Table 9, because smart meter is not able to measure the neutral voltage. Reason for this 
is the metering setup. Phase angles are also presented in other form at Matlab tool than in 
DMS.  
Table 9. Smart meter values from DMS. 
DMS values 
Length of AMKA 100m Angle 500m Angle 1km Angle 
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 230,0 0 226,3 0 221,8 0 
Phase L2 load 2,5kW 229,9 120,0 226,2 120,0 221,7 120,0 
Phase L3 load 2,5kW 230,0 240,0 226,3 240,0 221,8 240,0 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 229,5 0 224,1 0 217,9 0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 230,8 120,0 230,4 121,0 229,6 120,0 
Phase L3 load 1 kW 230,8 240,0 230,0 239,0 228,9 239,0 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5 kW 229,3 0 223,2 0 216,2 0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 230,7 120,0 229,8 121,0 228,6 122,0 
Phase L3 load 1E-5 kW 231,5 239,0 233,4 239,0 235,6 239,0 
 
73 
From Table 8 andTable 9, can be seen that the smart meter and the Matlab tool voltage 
magnitudes and angles are close to each others. This proves that iGW and SCADA for-
ward data in correct scale to DMS as well as amplifier does not cause much error in 
between meter and RTDS in normal conditions. 
Table 10 below presents calculated values in neutral conductor fault. The first column 
presents load conditions. Other columns present voltage magnitudes and angles in differ-
ent wye point grounding conditions of the low voltage network. There are three different 
grounding conditions: 5Ω, 20Ω, and 100Ω. Network length is 500m and load conditions 
are same as in Table 8 and Table 9. 
Table 10. Calculated values in neutral fault. 
Calculated values, neutral fault on 
Length of AMKA 5ohm Angle 20ohm Angle 100ohm Angle 
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 226,3 0,0 226,3 0,0 226,3 0,0 
Phase L2 load 2,5kW 226,3 -120,0 226,3 -120,0 226,3 -120,0 
Phase L3 load 2,5kW 226,3 120,0 226,3 120,0 226,3 120,0 
UN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 204,3 0,0 179,7 0,0 159,8 0,0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 240,7 -124,3 255,5 -129,0 268,6 -132,4 
Phase L3 load 1 kW 241,2 124,9 256,3 129,4 269,5 132,6 
UN 22,4 -0,8 47,6 -0,7 67,8 -0,5 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5 kW 195,3 0,0 157,0 0,0 125,0 0,0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 235,1 -132,3 250,5 -150,2 271,5 -169,8 
Phase L3 load 1E-5 kW 260,4 121,1 300,6 117,9 339,6 109,8 
UN 35,3 -24,3 81,3 -24,1 124,6 -24,0 
 
Table 11 below presents the smart meter’s measured values that are read from DMS. 
Values are listed as in Table 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
74 
Table 11. Smart meter measurements at DMS in neutral conductor fault. 
DMS values, neutral fault on 
Length of AMKA 5ohm Angle 20ohm Angle 100ohm Angle 
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 226,3 0 226,3 0 226,3 1 
Phase L2 load 2,5kW 226,2 120 226,2 120 226,2 121 
Phase L3 load 2,5kW 226,3 240 226,3 240 226,3 241 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5kW 204,3 0 179,7 0 159,8 0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 240,6 124 255,4 129 267,6 120 
Phase L3 load 1 kW 241,2 235 256,4 232 268,3 240 
              
Phase L1 load 2,5 kW 195,3 0 157 0 125 0 
Phase L2 load 1 kW 235,1 133 250,4 151 269,6 190 
Phase L3 load 1E-5 kW 260,5 239 285,2 242 298,9 251 
 
Table 10 and Table 11 present calculated and measured values in neutral fault of the low 
voltage network. As can be seen, measured values correspond the calculated values in 
neutral conductor fault. Only exceptions were with last loading scenario. In these simu-
lations the measurement did not correspond to calculated values. Reason for different 
measurements are in the RTDS model. The RTDS model has limiters for measurements 
to prevent exceeding voltage limit of the amplifier, which caused that with high voltages 
the measurements were not presented correctly at DMS.  
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6. CONCLUTION 
The objective of this thesis was to update and develop distribution automation laborato-
ries for course Distribution Automation that is arranged at TUT. The course has two pre-
vious laboratory environments that needed to be updated. 
The process began with defining the need for update and development potential. Parts 
from the previous laboratory implementations were not possible to use anymore, such as 
IEC 61850 MMS software, and some parts were needed to upgrade to new technologies, 
such as REX and PCs with Windows XP. Some new possibilities were interested to be 
implemented into laboratory environments. Also, an important aspect in environments 
was interesting and informative content.   
With these backgrounds the laboratories were improved. IED laboratory introduces new 
REF615 protection IEDs with extended features to present functionality of IEDs for stu-
dents. In substation automation laboratory, IEDs are connected to RTDS with open and 
close command inputs and status signal outputs. Blocking signal is implemented with 
Ethernet connection.   
The low voltage automation laboratory is updated with new SCADA and DMS, remote 
communication unit, and the smart meter. The laboratory environment extends the first 
laboratory by using the same network structure. In the second laboratory, the first labor-
atory environment’s substation is possible to control from SCADA environment. The 
substation communication is implemented with RTDS-iGW-SCADA link. In this way, 
students get idea from communication structure of substation automation. In the low volt-
age network, the smart meter’s values are transferred to SCADA through data concentra-
tor. Typically, smart meter data is not send to SCADA, but in the laboratory environment 
this was made, because ease of build and the system is easily scalable, because the mini-
mum amount of devices. The network topology and state is presented on DMS. From 
DMS, students are able to control the primary substation and observe customer smart 
meter measurements. 
The laboratories are tested with protection tests and measurement tests. The tests are sim-
ilar to students’ laboratory exercises. The substation automation laboratory operation was 
detected with different fault scenarios and operation conditions. The low voltage labora-
tory was tested with measurements where values were calculated with a Matlab tool at 
first and then values were compared to RTDS simulation values that were read from 
DMS. 
The laboratories present good overall view from distribution automation. The first labor-
atory presents IEDs and protection principles. The first laboratory environment is now 
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more informative than the previous one, because students have possibility to control cir-
cuit breakers and read events from IEDs screen. In the low voltage automation laboratory, 
SCADA and DMS systems are presented. In the previous implementation of the low volt-
age automation laboratory, the role of SCADA was not as clear as in new implementation. 
It is important that DMS and SCADA are well presented, because the systems are im-
portant part of the course.  
The future development needs are in the low voltage automation laboratory. The system 
could be extended by adding more functionalities to the substation. In presented imple-
mentation of the second laboratory, the functionality of substation does not present func-
tionality of real substation. Also, fault service functions could be added to the low voltage 
automation laboratory, which are implemented in the simulation model. A fault detection 
and clearance would be good extension. Fault indications and remote controllable discon-
nectors would be great to add to simulation model, because those devices are key part of 
distribution automation development in Finnish distribution companies. IED laboratory 
could be updated with better earth fault protection functions, but this is not necessary, 
because laboratory teaches the fundamentals from protection. 
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